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ABSTRACT 
Less than two decades after the conclusion of brutal civil wars, El Salvador and 
Guatemala are once again faced with high levels of violence stemming from drug 
trafficking, organized crime, corruption, and gangs. Overall, El Salvador was more 
successful in post-war state building. However, despite having stronger institutions and 
more capabilities, it is not better off when it comes to public security when compared to 
Guatemala, a state with weaker institutions and fewer resources. In fact, El Salvador’s 
homicide rates have been consistently higher. According to prevailing conventional 
wisdom, a country with stronger institutions and more resources should be more capable 
and effective at maintaining order, but this is not the case. This thesis examines the nature 
of crime, institutional capacity, and the effectiveness of government responses to reduce 
violent crime. It argues that decisions made during the transition period set these states on 
different paths. Furthermore, while strong institutions are important to maintaining order, 
government policy can strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of the institution. Strong 
institutions are necessary, but not sufficient. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Over the last fifty years, levels of crime and violence have been high in Central 
America.  From the mid-twentieth century through the mid-1990s, three countries in the 
region underwent civil wars as armed forces battled guerilla insurgency groups. The 
internal conflicts resulted in hundreds of human rights abuses and an estimated 335,000 
deaths. These civil wars came to an end with the signing of peace accords in Nicaragua in 
1990, in El Salvador in 1992, and finally in Guatemala in 1996.1 One of the main 
conditions outlined in each of the peace accords focused on security reform. Due to the 
human rights abuses, displacements, disappearances, and murders, which occurred during 
the civil war period, newly defined roles and structures were outlined for the military and 
police forces.  
After the signing of their respective peace accords, these countries took different 
routes to recovery and development. As a whole, countries within the region still struggle 
with poverty, inequality, and social development.2 Within a decade of  
the peace accords, these countries began facing new threats to public and human  
security due to a surge in illegal activity from organized crime, drug trafficking, and 
youth gangs. In terms of establishing political institutions, implementing measures to 
provide checks and balances on power, and executing police, military, judicial, and 
economic reforms, El Salvador has emerged as a stronger, more capable state when 
compared to Guatemala.3 While there is much room for economic growth and social 
improvement in El Salvador, the country has developed better than its northern neighbor 
 
 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC), “Crime and Development in Central America: 
Caught in the Crossfire,” (May 2007), 35. 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Central_America_Study_2007.pdf.  
2 UNDOC, “Crime and Development in Central America,” 9.  
3 Forest Colburn, “The Turnover in El Salvador,” Journal of Democracy 20(3) (July 2009): 344–346. 
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since the civil war period. Guatemala suffers from weak political parties, high levels of 
corruption in the government and security sector, and what some scholars refer to as 
“underinstitutionalization.”4 
Yet, despite these differences in democratic, economic, and security development, 
El Salvador is not better off when it comes to combating crime, violence, and drug 
trafficking within its geographic borders. If, according to political science theorists such 
as Samuel P. Huntington, the establishment of strong institutions is a necessary condition 
to establishing a state capable of maintaining political stability and order within the 
country, then why has criminal activity as a result of gangs and illegal drug trafficking 
had the same outcome, if not slightly worse, in El Salvador than in Guatemala?5 
According to theory, the country that has stronger political party systems, stronger 
security institutions, and more available resources should be more capable and effective 
at maintaining order. However, this is not the case.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
There has been a significant increase in violence and crime in Central America 
within recent years. Today, Central America is the most violent region in the world.6 
Geographically, these countries are located in between the world’s number one supply 
country for cocaine and the world’s top consumer country of the illegal drug. The rise in 
criminal activity is largely attributed to illegal drug trafficking. Mexican drug cartels 
exploit porous borders, lax security forces, and corrupt government and security officials. 
Drug trafficking and the prevalence of gang activity, which is sometimes related and 
sometimes separate from illicit trafficking activities, have undermined economic 
development and human security in the region.7 Specifically, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
                                                 
4 Omar Sanchez, “Guatemala’s Party Universe: A Case Study in Underinstitutionalization,” Latin 
American Politics and Society 50(1) (Spring 2008): 123; and International Crisis Group, “Guatemala: 
Squeezed Between Crime and Impunity,” Latin America Report 33 (22 June 2010): i. 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1968), 4–5.  
6 The Economist, “Security in Central America: Rounding up the governments,” June 23, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18867590/print. 
7 Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Humberto Lopez, “Crime and Violence in Central America: A 
Development Challenge,” The World Bank (2011), ii–iii. 
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and Honduras lead the region in violent crime rates, and in the past few years, these three 
neighboring countries have become “the most violent region in the world outside of 
active war zones.”8  
Less than two decades after the conclusion of brutal civil wars, the region is once 
again faced with high levels of violence, and security forces within these countries have 
not been successful in curtailing the violence. It is estimated that over 200,000 people 
died in Guatemala’s thirty-six year civil war from 1960 to 1996 and an estimated 75,000 
people died in El Salvador’s twelve-year civil war from 1980–1992.9 Although there is a 
lack of concrete data, some analysts estimate that today’s homicide and violent crime 
rates exceed the estimated death toll of the region’s civil wars.  
Over the last decade, United States foreign policy and aid to stem drug trafficking 
from and within Latin America has largely been concentrated on Mexico and Colombia. 
Through Plan Colombia, which was established in 1999, the United States has provided 
approximately $8.5 billion United States Dollars (USD) in aid to Colombia.10 The 
Merida Initiative, established in 2008, pledges $400 million USD for Mexico, but only a 
combined $65 million in aid for the seven countries within Central America, the  
 
Dominican Republic, and Haiti.11 Central America has received the least amount of 
economic aid and support from the United States, but currently has the highest crime and 
corruption rates.  
                                                 
8 Kevin Casas-Zamora, “Paying Attention to Central Americas Drug Trafficking Crisis,” The 
Brookings Institute, October 27, 2010, 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1027_central_america_drugs_casaszamora.aspx.  
9 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Guatemala,” May 24, 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html; and Central Intelligence 
Agency, “The World Factbook: El Salvador,” May 2, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/es.html. 
10 Lisa Haugaard, Adam Isacson and Jennifer Johnson, “A Cautionary Tale: Plan Colombia’s Lessons 
Toward Mexico and Beyond,” The Washington Office on Latin America Publication, November 2011, 
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Cautionary_Tale.pdf. 
11 United States Department of State, “Merida Initiative Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2009, 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/merida/.  
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Central American governments and security forces are losing in the fight against 
drug traffickers and gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street gang 
(M-18). Guatemala is losing sovereignty in its northern region to Mexican drug cartels. 
Current President of Guatemala, Alvaro Colom, has stated that the Los Zetas control 
“seven or eight provinces—35 to 40 percent of our territory.”12 Recognizing the “grave 
threat posed by criminal groups” in the region, the United States increased aid to the 
region through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and in June 
2011 at a conference in Guatemala City, in which the heads of state in Central America, 
Colombia, and Mexico met to discuss violence and crime in the region, the United States 
pledged another $300 million towards security efforts this year. The United Nations 
Development Program, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank also 
pledged millions of dollars to support regional efforts.13 However, financial assistance, 
while critical, is not sufficient. 
The importance of the research question of why El Salvador—a country with 
more stable institutions, a larger, better trained police force, more financial resources, and 
preventive social development programs—has consistently had a higher violent crime 
rates than it’s “underinstitutionalized,” less capable neighbor of Guatemala may help to 
determine what other factors governments need to consider and possibly counter in their 
fight against violence in the region. The presidents in each of these countries agree that 
this is a regional problem that will require a regional solution and they are trying to learn 
from each other. The crime threatens public and private security, the economy, and 
sovereignty. International organizations will likely continue to provide economic and 
development aid to the region, but if these funds are not used to bolster the right 
government institutions or policies, the efforts may be in vain, and human security will 
continue to plague the region. Under CARSI the United States Department of State 
efforts to confront security issues in Central America, “builds upon existing strategies 
                                                 
12 Jaime Dettmer, “Colombia, Central America Record Huge Drug Seizures,” Dialogo, March 10, 
2011, http://www.dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2011/10/03/aa-
central-america-drugs. 
13 The Economist, “Security in Central America: Rounding up the Governments,” June 23, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18867590/print.  
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and programs, both on a bilateral and regional basis. It is designed to stop the flow of 
narcotics, arms, weapons, and bulk cash generated by illicit drug sales, and to confront 
gangs and criminal organizations.”14 However, if the existing strategies have not served 
to stem violence and increase citizen security in El Salvador and Guatemala, perhaps this 
thesis will illuminate how financial, law enforcement cooperation, and military assistance 
from the United States can be used more effectively in Central America.  
C. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis begins with the following puzzle, or problem. Research suggests that 
strong state and party institutions should lead to political and public order.15 However, 
the Salvadoran and Guatemalan cases challenge these expectations. In Central America, 
El Salvador’s state and party system have been notably strong and stable since the 
country’s transition from civil war to democracy through peace accords. Notable in 
particular have been Salvadoran state security efforts to combat crime and violence. In 
contrast, Guatemala stands out as weakly institutionalized on all fronts, and yet the 
Guatemalan security reality is no worse than that of El Salvador. 
Both El Salvador and Guatemala experience high levels of crime and violence. 
Estimates from the respective national police institutions and the Pan American Health 
Organization calculate the intentional homicide rate in El Salvador to be 66 per 100,000 
people as compared to 41.4 per 100,000 in Guatemala.16 While these numbers are 
estimates, the rate in El Salvador is notably higher than Guatemala. 
High levels of crime and violence in the two countries exist in spite of substantial 
variation in institutional capacity. El Salvador is a case of significant capacity relative to 
the Guatemalan case. In terms of party strength, El Salvador has two major political 
parties. The Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) established in 1981 is the main 
                                                 
14 Bureau of Public Affairs, The United States Department of State, “The Central America Regional 
Security Initiative: A Shared Partnership,” August 5, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/fs/2010/145747.htm.  
15 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1968); and Scott Mainwaring, “Party Systems in the Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 
9(3) (July 1998): 67-81. 
16 UNODC, “2011 Global Study on Homicide,” http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf, 93. 
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conservative party within the country, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN), which became an official political party in 1992, is the main left-wing party. On 
the other hand, Guatemala has over thirteen political parties, none of which have been 
able to win consecutive president election or maintain a majority of seats within 
parliament more than one election cycle. Parties are quickly marginalized and new ones 
are created, thus making it more difficult for them to gain legitimacy among the 
populace.17  
Turning from political parties to state institutions, again Guatemala looks weak 
relative to El Salvador. El Salvador has approximately 362 police officers and 10 judges 
per 100,000 people while Guatemala has only 119 police officers and 6 judges per 
100,000 people.18   
If we look at state institutions particularly with regard to anti-crime and anti-
violence efforts, again we see that El Salvador stands out as much more institutionalized 
than Guatemala. In 2003, the Salvadoran government undertook a Mano Dura, iron first 
or heavy hand, approach to combat crime. This policy allows the police and justice 
system to convict and imprison criminals on lesser charges. In contrast, Guatemala’s 
President Alvaro Colom (2008–present) concentrated more on development and 
concentrated public spending on social welfare programs as opposed to police and 
military spending to suppress criminal activity.19 In spite of its hardline nature, the highly 
controversial Mano Dura has not significantly decreased crime rates in El Salvador.20   
A preliminary look at the available data indicates security policy, in addition the 
strength of government institutions and the degree of democratic consolidation, can be a 
determinant for whether or not these countries are able to successfully combat crimes and 
                                                 
17 Omar Sanchez, “Guatemala’s Party Universe: A Case Study in Underinstitutionalization,” Latin 
American Politics and Society 50(1) (Spring 2008): 128. 
18 UNODC, “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire” (May 2007), 31-
32, 82. 
19 The Economist, “Guatemala’s Presidential Election: The Return of the Iron Fist,” September 10, 
2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21528620/print. 
20 Tom Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner, Maras: Gang Violence and Security in 
Central America (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 11. 
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render a more stable and orderly society. Indicating that strong institutions are necessary, 
but policy also matters. The iron fist approach to crime has not proven successful, but an 
adoption of social and economic developmental policies may be effective. However, 
development takes time. In the short term, it will be difficult to determine the payoffs 
from investing in social programs.  
One hypothesis to be explored is how violent gangs and drug traffickers have 
infiltrated the state and society in both El Salvador and Guatemala but, given the different 
institutional contexts, this infiltration has taken different forms. Research for this thesis 
will began by considering the following elements of the two cases. In some instances, 
there is a nexus between gangs and drug trafficking, but criminals involved in gangs do 
not necessarily participate in the illegal drug trade, and drug traffickers in country have 
not necessarily linked up with the criminal gangs. El Salvador’s largest violent crime 
issues stem from gangs, such as MS-13 and M-18. For Guatemala, facets of Mexican 
drug cartels operating and even controlling certain parts of the country present a larger 
problem for its security forces, than the gangs operating within the cities. Statistically, a 
homicide is a homicide, but when trying to determine the best way to combat crime, it 
may matter whether to focus more on gangs or drug trafficking.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overall, most of the literature on insecurity in Central America has focused on the 
transition periods, democratic consolidation, and institutional reform, efficiency and 
effectiveness.21 It is interesting that the comparative studies which have been undertaken, 
whether they focus on political party systems, economic reform, the police or the military 
have largely depicted El Salvador as having a greater capacity to combat violence and 
crime. What is missing among this literature is a study on why the outcome in 
 
 
                                                 
21 In addition to the scholarly literature, international organizations such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and various offices within the United Nations, such as the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, provide a plethora of information and figures on the economy, crime, 
development, and drug trafficking in Central America. Periodic reports from these organizations provide a 
comprehensive tool to analyze trends in the region. 
 8
El Salvador is very similar to that of Guatemala in terms of the impact of gangs and 
drugs. Should not the more capable state have less crime? This thesis research will 
attempt to fill this gap. 
As an example of the main focus of research on politics in Central America, John 
A. Booth analyzes how global economic and international factors impact domestic 
political transformations. He discusses regime transformation within Central America, 
but pays particular attention to Guatemala’s democratic, economic, social, and political 
development. In his article, “Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala in the 
Central American Context,” Booth uses the case study of Guatemala to argue that regime 
change in Central America was not based solely on domestic actors. He concludes that 
external forces influenced the internal transformation process. This work takes into 
account the impact international actors had on the country’s post-war development. 22 In 
this tradition of focusing on political transition in Central America, Forest Colburn’s 
research on El Salvador highlights how the country has been able to attain democratic 
consolidation after its civil war. In “The Turnover in El Salvador,” Colburn highlights 
key achievements by the Salvadoran government since its transition. Specifically, he 
emphasizes how the country has developed strong political institutions, integrated 
business into politics, and has developed a culture that places law over individuals. He 
notes that although El Salvador is a poor nation when compared to other nations in Latin 
America, it has made significant progress over the last two decades.23 
To the extent that studies of crime in Central America do present hypotheses 
about varied levels of crime and violence, they cannot explain why El Salvador has 
experienced high levels of crime and violence relative to the Guatemalan case. The ideas 
in the literature in fact have roots in Samuel P. Huntington’s classic Political Order in 
Changing Societies.24 Huntington, an institutionalist, argues that strong political 
institutions are essential for new states to achieve security, development, and growth.  
                                                 
22 John A. Booth, “Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala in the Central American Context,” 
Latin American Politics and Society 42(4) (Winter 2000): 21-47. 
23 Forest Colburn, “The Turnover in El Salvador,” Journal of Democracy, 20(3) (July 2009): 143-152. 
24 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1968).  
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States that try to accomplish social equality and economic development prior to 
establishing strong institutions will most likely fail and the result will be an instable, 
violent society.25 He argues for institutions first, then order will follow and this will 
create the environment for sustain development. Huntington focuses on both “input” 
institutions—i.e., political parties that moderate citizens’ demands and lengthen their 
time horizons—and “output” institutions, or institutions of the state, to implement 
government policies.26 
With regard to state institutions, Huntington expects that effective state 
institutions will be able to contribute to directly providing services, of obvious concern 
for the present thesis, given its focus on levels of crime and violence and thus state 
effectiveness in addressing these issues. In terms of economics, El Salvador collects more 
tax and other revenues from its populace, has lower poverty and inequality rates, and 
spends more on education than Guatemala, yet it suffers from greater internal violence 
than Guatemala.27 Furthermore, Huntington’s focus on state institutions is echoed in 
specific studies of public security institutions in Latin America. In Criminality, Public 
Security, and the challenge to democracy in Latin America, Bergman and Whitehead 
examine the institutional capacity of various governments to combat crime, giving 
particular attention to the effectiveness of judicial systems and the legal processes. Their 
work also examines causal factors of crime in the region.28  
Studying the effectiveness of state institutions in the specific context of 
democratic Central America requires considering the unique challenges and opportunities 
for reforming state institutions in the aftermath of civil war. One comparative study that 
predicts lower rates of crime and violence in El Salvador than what we observe is 
Douglas Kincaid’s “Demilitarization and Security in El Salvador and Guatemala: 
                                                 
25 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 4–5. 
26 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 84–85. 
27 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Guatemala,” May 24, 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html; and Central Intelligence 
Agency, “The World Factbook: El Salvador,” May 2, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/es.html. 
28 Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead, Criminality, Public Security, and the challenge to 
democracy in Latin America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009).  
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Convergences of Success and Crisis.” He discusses the details of the respective peace 
accords and examines how security reform was implemented in the two nations. Key 
conclusions from his work show how El Salvador was able to develop a larger, better-
trained national police by purging the majority of pre-transition personnel. In Guatemala 
the conditions outlined in the peace accord were not followed as closely. A rise in 
violence and other criminal activity before the national police force could be developed 
in accordance to the peace accords, led to pre-transition personnel keeping their positions 
within the military, police, and intelligence services. The result has been a more corrupt 
security force. Kincaid’s main evidence and argument centers on how the fulfillment of 
the peace accords was a necessary precondition for a functioning political democracy and 
development.29 Though interesting, Kincaid’s study does not offer a solution to the 
problem at hand: His analysis leads us to expect that El Salvador would experience lower 
levels of crime and violence, given the effective security forces in that country, relative to 
the case of Guatemala. 
Another important piece of literature that specifically addresses both transitions 
and civilian security in Latin America is Charles T. Call’s article “War Transitions and 
the New Civilian Security in Latin America.” Call provides a good overview on the 
leading arguments on democratization, institutionalization, and reform for newer 
democracies and breaks them down into four different categories. He takes into account 
the theories of scholars and academics such as Samuel Huntington, Wendy Hunter, 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Scott Mainwaring, James Petras, William Robinson, and others. 
He highlights how the demilitarization of internal security, such as national and police 
forces, will impact political development, and concludes that the weakening of the armed 
forces in the post transition phase is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for internal 
security reform.30 Overall, he argues that war transitions provide an opportunity for 
greater security reform than as seen in non-war transitions. Call uses specific examples in 
                                                 
29 A. Douglas Kincaid, “Demilitarization and Security in El Salvador and Guatemala: Convergences 
of Success and Crisis,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42(4) Special Issue: 
Globalization and Democratization in Guatemala (Winter 2000): 39-58. 
30 Charles T. Call, “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America,” Comparative 
Politics 35(1) (October 2002), 1–2. 
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his argument, which evidence from both El Salvador and Guatemala. Following Call, this 
thesis will explore whether the two countries’ security forces are similarly ineffective due 
to the civil war and/or war transitions. 
Comparative research on El Salvador and Guatemala brings to the fore the 
question of public trust in and support for state institutions, and therefore the issue of 
whether state security forces will be ordered in to aggressively fight crime. In Orlando 
Perez’ “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El 
Salvador and Guatemala,” he is most concerned with human security and public 
confidence in the national police. He argues there is a connection between crimes within 
a society and how society views democracy and concludes that the police’s inability to 
fight crime weakens democratic legitimacy.31 This work provides a necessary viewpoint 
of the subject because public confidence for internal security forces can impact whether 
or not citizens decide to report or ignore criminal activity; in addition, it can also impact 
whether or not they will support repressive or authoritarian-leaning governments and 
laws. From analyzing the responses in public surveys, Perez finds that trust and 
confidence in the national police to be slightly higher in El Salvador than in Guatemala. 
While the survey questions posed to measure support for authoritarian measures within 
each country were slightly different, approximately 31% of Salvadorians surveyed would 
support authoritarian measures. In Guatemala, he found that while the majority of 
respondents would support a “strong-hand” government, they did not equate “strong-
hand” to authoritarianism.32  
Importantly from the perspective of state effectiveness, whereas from one 
perspective a strong state stance against crime and violence should be effective, therefore 
leading us to expect that the Salvadoran approach would reduce crime and violence, 
others take the opposite view. A major critique of El Salvador found in literature today 
focuses on the Mano Dura policy the government has undertaken to combat increased 
gang and drug trafficking activity. In “El Salvador Responds to Gangs,” Mo Hume 
                                                 
31 Orlando Perez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El 
Salvador and Guatemala,” Political Science Quarterly 18 (4) (Winter 2003/2004): 627-644. 
32 Perez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity,” 638–641. 
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discusses how the government’s focus on repression versus prevention has not had the 
desired effect of reducing crime rates. Hume argues that this zero tolerance type policy 
and repressive measures undertaken by the government is a sign of a weakening 
democracy. 33  
Turning from state institutions to political parties, Huntington is focused on how 
political parties can serve the function of controlling and reducing the potential for 
destabilizing political activities. For purposes of this thesis, the question of political 
parties, and especially in the democratic context, raises two potential, opposite 
predictions, neither of which plays out in the Guatemala-El Salvador comparison. On the 
one hand, in a democracy stronger political parties increase political accountability and 
therefore suggest that state institutions, such as the police force, will be employed more 
effectively in settings where parties are stronger.34 However, at the same time that parties 
ensure more accountability, they can also stand in the way of radical shifts in policy, such 
as a move toward a hardline anticrime or anti-gang policy. Scott Mainwaring found cases 
of weak party institutionalization to be higher in third wave democracies, and while these 
governments still function, it hinders consolidation.35 Indeed, it is precisely in a setting of 
weak institutional checks on the executive where citizens throw up their hands and grant 
the executive excessive powers to address major crises, focused more on the ends and 
less on the means to successfully addressing the problem.36 Given that El Salvador and 
Guatemala differ substantially in terms of the strength of their political parties and yet 
both countries experience high levels of crime and violence, party institutionalization 
cannot tell the whole story. Though El Salvador’s level of violence and crime is 
somewhat higher than that of Guatemala, this difference has not been the result of 
political parties interfering with Salvadoran executive actions to crack down on violence 
and crime, given that the government has in fact pursued a hardline policy. 
                                                 
33 Mo Hume, “El Salvador Responds to Gangs,” Development in Practice 17(6) (November 2007): 
739-751. 
34 Scott Mainwaring, “Party Systems in the Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 9(3) (July 1998): 67-
81. 
35 Mainwaring, “Party Systems in the Third Wave,” 67-81. 
36 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5(1) (January 1994): 55-69. 
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The themes of weak institutions are present in specific research on the 
Guatemalan case. Like the comparative studies, most contemporary literature involving 
single case studies on Guatemala analyzes the path the government has taken since the 
end of the 1996 civil war and its ability to govern, provide security, and implement 
necessary reforms. Mark Ruhl’s “The Guatemalan Military since the Peace Accords: The 
Fate of Reform under Arzu and Portillo,” is an example of this type of literature. Ruhl 
examines the policies implemented by the first two democratic administrations in 
Guatemala after the peace accords. He argues that the civilian government did not 
adequately enact control over the military reform process. He points the finger at the 
administrations for failing to implement firm control over the military. Ruhl’s article is 
important because it provides insight on civil-military relations within Guatemala and 
will potentially shed light on the means by which the Guatemalan state combats 
insecurity, in a context of overall weak political and state institutions.  
In terms of Guatemala’s weak parties in particular, work by Omar Sanchez 
provides analysis of Guatemala’s political institutions. He uses the framework established 
by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully to analyze Guatemala’s party systems. The title 
of his article, “Guatemala’s Party Universe: A Case Study in Underinstitutionalization,” 
provides a good harbinger to his findings.  He criticizes the Guatemalan political system 
as being an “instrument” for actors in the military, business, and even organized crime 
sectors. Sanchez argues this is a result of Guatemala’s history and path dependence. He 
highlights that parties were not created or developed within the community or society, but 
instead developed simply to contest elections. The result is a “nonsystem of parties” and 
institutions too weak to be relevant.37 Sanchez’ argument is unique in that it points to 
path dependence as the reason for Guatemala’s current state of affairs. Drawing on this 
study, the present thesis will seek to identify the different mechanisms by which 
organized crime has taken hold in El Salvador, given the stronger political institutions 
there. 
                                                 
37 Omar Sanchez, “Guatemala’s Party Universe: A Case Study in Underinstitutionalization,” Latin 
American Politics and Society 50(1) (Spring 2008): 123-151. 
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E. METHODS 
The analysis set forth in this research utilizes a comparative case study between 
Guatemala and El Salvador to find answers to the major research question. Up until the 
mid-twentieth century, there are many historical similarities between Guatemala and El 
Salvador’s development. To begin, both El Salvador and Guatemala went through civil 
wars. While the underlying causes of their respective civil wars were slightly different, 
the end of these wars and the beginning of the peace process created a unique opportunity 
for change in both states. At the conclusion of their respective civil wars, these countries 
took divergent paths towards establishing new institutions. El Salvador’s war lasted 
twelve years, and Guatemala’s lasted for thirty-six years. It is necessary to trace aspects 
of how the governments transitioned from military led governments to democratic rule in 
particular areas, specifically with respect to building state security and judicial 
institutions. The negotiated peace accords have several factors in common, and not all of 
the conditions have been met. It is important to track what has actually been done and to 
what extent post-civil war security policies and reforms have been instituted. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis compares the two countries across three main sectors—political 
institutions, security institutions and the policies and programs implemented to combat 
violent crime.  It begins like most of the other literary works on the topic. Chapter II 
establishes the nature of crime within both countries and outlines the working definitions 
used throughout the analysis. It compares the nature of crime and the degree to which 
these crimes contribute to the overall intentional homicide rates. It rules out the type of 
crime as an explanation for the outcome.  
Chapter III discusses the peace accords within each state and details how the 
security institutions were established. It is necessary to look at which conditions were 
actually met and the degree to which they were fulfilled. It details how El Salvador 




capacity, than neighboring Guatemala. It concludes that institutional capacity, while 
important does not guarantee effectiveness. It also lays the groundwork for the major 
argument presented in Chapter IV.  
Chapter IV presents the central argument. It uses an institutional path-dependent 
framework to analyze the two cases, and concludes the decisions made during the 
transition period set the security institutions within the two countries on divergent paths. 
Because El Salvador invested more into building up a new national police force during 
the transitional phase, its forces are better trained, less corrupt, and more capable than 
Guatemala. Unlike El Salvador, Guatemala chose to maintain a large portion of existing 
forces, which weakened the strength of the institution in the long term and allowed old 
practices, such as corruption, and incompetence to continue. Guatemala’s murder rates 
have consistently increased in its post-war years, proving institutions matter. The chapter 
goes on to argue that government policy in El Salvador, as a result of the exaggerated, 
sensationalist view of gangs in society, only served to exacerbate the crime problem. 
Homicide rates were steadily declining before the implementation of the Mano Dura 
Plan. After Mano Dura there was a notable increase in homicide rates. Similar results 
were seen in Guatemala, when its police force implemented repressive tactics against 
youth gangs. The second part of the argument demonstrates how government policy can 
undermine institutional effectiveness.  
Finally, Chapter V provides a summary of the major findings and reiterates the 
central argument. It discusses policy recommendations for both El Salvador and 
Guatemala as well as for United States efforts to support these countries in addressing 
these public security issues. If left unchecked, the current nature of crime in Central 
America can have a devastating impact on regional stability. It is in the interest of these 
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II. DEFINING THE CRIME, EXAMINING THE DATA, AND 
DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF CRIME IN 
EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA 
It is widely agreed that a combination of drug trafficking, organized crime 
syndicates, and gangs, are the leading factors that undermine public security in both El 
Salvador and Guatemala. Each of these activities is prevalent in both countries, but the 
levels and complexity vary within each state. For example, Guatemala is known to have 
more drug trafficking activity than El Salvador.  This chapter examines the nature of the 
crime within both countries to determine whether or not the type of violence can shed 
light on the reason why El Salvador has higher homicide rates. It is important to highlight 
at the start that while each of these undertakings are contributors to violent crime and 
public insecurity, it should not be assumed the activities of these entities are intertwined. 
Studies have shown that while youth gangs in Central America may deal drugs locally, 
they are not linked up with transnational narco-trafficking networks.38 
This chapter will only discuss drug trafficking, organized crime, and youth gangs.  
However, it is acknowledged they are not the only activities that contribute to criminal 
violence. As Geoff Thale, Program Director for the Washington Office on Latin America 
(WOLA), has emphasized: 
Discussion of violence in Central America often begins and ends with 
youth gangs and drug dealers, as if these were the only forms of violence 
that citizens in Central America experience. But in fact, citizens confront a 
broad spectrum of violence, and it is important to locate both youth gangs 
and organized criminal groups within that spectrum.39 
                                                 
38 Center for Inter-American Studies and Programs at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, 
the Ford Foundation and the Kellogg Foundation, sponsors, Executive Summary of “Transnational Youth 
Gangs in Central America, Mexico, and the United States,”(2009), 
http://interamericanos.itam.mx/maras/docs/Resumen_Ejecutivo_Ingles.pdf, 2; and Sonja Wolf, “Mara 
Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas?,” Latin America Politics and Society 54(1) 
(2012): 68. 
39 Violence in Central America Briefing and Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representative. 110th Cong. 1 (June 26, 2007) 
(statement of Geoff Thale, Program Director for the Washington Office on Latin America). 
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In a 2007 statement to the United States Congress, Thale highlighted how intra-familial 
violence and politically motivated crimes are also sources of violence.40 In depth 
discussions of these types of violence goes beyond the scope of this research because 
current research has not shown these to be major contributors to homicide rates, but they 
are noteworthy as factors that affect the overall levels of violence in country.  
An important factor to highlight before discussing the statistical data associated 
with criminal violence is how the illegal natures of these activities make it difficult to 
narrow down exact numbers. In researching this topic, a repeated theme, and frustration, 
echoed by analysts, authors, and scholars has been the difficulty associated with data 
collection and determining exact figures. Factors such as a lack of reporting and poor 
collection methods have hampered data collection. Nonetheless, international 
organizations and state institutions have worked to establish estimates, and these figures 
have been beneficial to developing and analyzing regional trends. 
This chapter assesses whether the level of activity, i.e., the number of gang 
members or prevalence of drug traffickers, within the state, could be a reason why El 
Salvador has consistently had higher homicide rates.  Using available data, this chapter 
examines the extent to which gangs, drug trafficking, and other types of organized 
criminal activity contribute to homicide rates in both countries.  Overall, it shows the 
types of illicit activity, which generally leads to homicides, is more prevalent in 
Guatemala.  
A. DEFINING THE CRIME 
While there is a common consensus on the contributors of crime, there are 
different opinions on their definitions, such as what constitutes a gang and its 
membership. Another topic of interest is which of these groups cause the most violence. 
Are illicit drug traffickers responsible for the majority of the deaths or is youth gang 
activity the main reason for increased homicide rates? This section will discuss the 
definitions that will be referred to throughout the analysis. 
                                                 
40 Violence in Central America Briefing and Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representative. 110th Cong, 1. (June 26, 2007) 
(statement of Geoff Thale, Program Director for the Washington Office on Latin America). 
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1. Defining Gangs 
There are various definitions within literature as to what constitutes a gang. These 
differences in definitions are a contributing factor to divergent estimates on the quantity 
and number of gang members in Central America. For example, after obtaining data from 
different sources, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
research project noted that gang member estimates in Guatemala varied widely, ranging 
from 14,000 to 165,000 members.41 Part of the variation comes from terminology. The 
term gang can refer to juvenile delinquents who join together to commit various acts of 
crime, and the same term can refer to more formalized structures of groups who have 
initiation processes, rules, distinct identities that separate them from other groups, and 
have a defined operating area. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
provides a distinction between these two types, and defines the latter as an 
“institutionalized gang.”42 
When the term gang is used in this analysis, it refers to institutionalized gangs as 
defined by the UNODC. In Central America and in some literature the terms maras and 
pandillas are also used, sometimes interchangeably, in reference to gangs. Pandillas is a 
traditional term that has been used within Central American countries since the 1950s to 
describe gangs.43  Maras is a more contemporary term that has been used to refer to the 
larger, more dangerous post-civil war gangs, with transnational origins.44 Research has 
shown that maras have proven to be more dangerous, than other pandillas, but both 
contribute to violent crime in El Salvador and Guatemala.   
a. History of Major Gangs in Central America 
Over the last two decades, Central American youth gangs have risen to be 
a contentious topic of discussion in both Central American and in the United States. 
                                                 
41 U. S. Agency for International Development, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, 
Annex 2: Guatemala Profile (April 2006), 3. 
42 UNODC, “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire,” (May 2007), 58. 
43 UNODC, “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire,” (May 2007), 59. 
44 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Gangs in Central America, by Clare 
Ribando Seelke, CRS Report RL34112 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, January 2011), 4. 
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Almost any dialogue on gangs in Central America will bring up Mara Salvatrucha also 
known as MS-13 and Barrio Dieciocho also known as 18th Street Gang, Barrio 18, and 
M-18. They are the two dominant, most populated gangs in the Central American region.  
The origins and history of these gangs is an important part of understanding its current 
transnational nature. These two gangs originated in immigrant communities in the Los 
Angeles area of California. During the mid-to-late 20th century, thousands of Central 
Americans migrated to the United States to escape the civil wars in their native countries. 
Many established themselves within existing Spanish-speaking immigrant communities 
in the Los Angeles area. At the time, Los Angeles had several existing gangs, which were 
primarily defined by ethnicity. 18th Street Gang, formed in the 1960s, was primarily a 
Mexican gang, which accepted members from different ethnicities.  In the 1980s, there 
was a surge in El Salvadoran migrants to the area, and these youth banded together to 
form their own Salvadoran gang to protect themselves against existing gangs, and thus 
Mara Salvatrucha was created. Originally, Mara Salvatrucha consisted of primarily El 
Salvadorans, but like the 18th Street Gang, it later opened itself up to other ethnicities 
from Central America. These new gangs assimilated to gang culture in Los Angeles and 
became involved in violence against rival gangs and criminal activities.45   
Mara Salvatrucha went through several evolutions as a result of 
confrontations with other gangs in the Los Angeles area and laws in the United States. In 
the 1990s, in order to compete against other rival gangs, it formed an alliance with the 
Mexican Mafia gang, also known as Los Emes or in English, The M’s, and added the 
number 13 to its name to signify this alliance, because the letter “m” is the thirteenth 
letter of the alphabet. Gang violence increased and more gang members were imprisoned. 
The major catalyst that exported MS-13 and M-18 to Central America was the 1996 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act passed in the United 
States. This law allowed the legal deportation of non-U.S. citizens serving terms in U.S. 
prisons back to their native countries. Annual deportations “skyrocketed” and thousands 
                                                 
45 Washington Office on Latin America, “Central American Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource 




of gang members were deported to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.  They took 
with them the violent gang culture, and formed new cells in their home countries.46 
b. Current Gang Statistics 
MS-13 and M-18 quickly developed roots and established a permanent 
presence in El Salvador and Guatemala. However, it is important to highlight that 
although the two major gangs in El Salvador and Guatemala share the same origin, the 
numerous cells established within these countries are not the same. As a USAID 
assessment on gangs in Central America states, “one mara does not fit all.”47 Of equal 
importance, is that while MS-13 and M-18 are “transnational,” in that it is established in 
several countries in Central America—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—as well 
as different cities across the United States there has been little concrete evidence to 
suggest that these gangs have a clear hierarchal leadership structure. Instead analysts 
have found that these gangs are comprised of smaller, decentralized units. The units 
create an extensive network, but there is not proof of a single transnational leader or sect 
who makes decisions for the entire gang or controls and orchestrates gang activity.48 
There are more distinctions between and within gangs in both El Salvador and 
Guatemala, but these specific characteristics go beyond the scope of this research. The 
particular aspect this research examines is how these gangs contribute to overall violent 
crime rates in their respective countries. 
The El Salvadoran Interior Ministry estimates 15,000 gang members in 
country, while the UNDOC estimates there are 10,500.49 Similarly, the Guatemalan 
National Police estimate the numbers of gang members in country to be between 8,000 
                                                 
46 Al Valdez, “The Origins of Southern California Latino Gangs,” in Maras: Gang Violence and 
Security in Central America, ed. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin: 
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47 U. S. Agency for International Development, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, Annex 
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48 Sonja Wolf, “ Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas?,” Latin 
America Politics and Society 54(1) (Spring 2012), 67. 
49 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Crime and Development in Central 
America: Caught in the Crossfire,” (May 2007), 60; and Washington Office on Latin America, “Central 
American Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource Guide: Gangs in El Salvador,” (May 29, 2008), 2. 
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and 10,000, while the UNODC estimates 14,000.50 In terms of size, El Salvador and 
Guatemala both have approximately 10,000–15,000 gang members.  Guatemala has an 
estimated population of 14.7 million people, but most of this population lives in rural 
areas. El Salvador has a population of 6.1 million people, with 35% residing in rural 
areas. The youth gangs these countries are dealing with are largely an urban 
phenomenon, and gang activity within both states is concentrated in the larger cities.  
c. Crime Attributed to Gangs 
It is well known that gangs are linked to illegal activity. However, one of 
the most controversial topics is the specific type of crime and the degree to which gangs 
are involved in them. This topic is debated in the literature for both El Salvador and 
Guatemala.  Criminal activities attributed to gangs include theft, armed robberies, drug 
sales, extortion, rape, and homicides.51 It is agreed that gangs are becoming more 
sophisticated and have changed their operating areas and activities in response to 
increased pressure from law enforcement entities.  However, a topic of debate surrounds 
the quantity of homicides attributed to gangs. Some academic research, journal articles, 
media, and political officials attribute the leading cause of rising violent crime rates in El  
Salvador and Guatemala to youth gang activity.52,53 For example, an April 2012 report 
from the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action states, “soaring 
homicide rates and widespread perceptions of insecurity are also largely due to the 
proliferation of local gangs.”54 Despite these generalized claims, the evidence and data 
collected and analyzed, while limited, depicts gangs in El Salvador and Guatemala as 
being responsible for a lesser portion of overall homicide rates in the region. According 
to a 2011 World Bank report, “multiple sources suggest that perhaps 15 percent of 
                                                 
50 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “Central American Gang-Related Asylum: A 
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51 Sonja Wolf, “ Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas?,” Latin 
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homicides are gang related.”55 Data collected by El Salvador’s Institute of Legal 
Medicine attributed only 13.4% of total homicides from 2003 to 2006 to gangs. Again, 
while data is limited, there were similar findings taken from police statistics in Guatemala 
during a period when the country experienced an increase in homicide rates.56 In order to 
make concrete assessments, more data need to be collected and analyzed in a systematic 
manner, but the existing data suggest that gangs, while contributors, are not the primary 
agents of intentional homicides. The point is not to minimalize the homicides by gang 
members, but to show statistically that homicides by gang members represent a smaller 
portion of the overall homicide rates. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime data, the average rate for El Salvador between 2005-2010 has been 
approximately 62 homicides per 100,000 people. Fifteen percent of this rate is 
approximately 9 homicides per 100,000 people. This is still almost double the number of 
homicides in the United States, which averages 5 homicides per 100,000. 
These distinctions described bear relevance to the primary question posed 
in this research in trying to determine why El Salvador has consistently had higher 
violent criminal rates and homicides than Guatemala. It is not likely that the reason for El 
Salvador’s consistently higher violent crime rates is due to the factor that they have a 
higher percentage of gang members in their population than Guatemala.   
2. Defining Drug Trafficking 
The presence of drug traffickers is a major contributor to violent crimes in Central 
America. Due to its geographic location, porous borders, and lax law enforcement and 
judiciary institutions, the Central American corridor has become the preferred route for 
drug trafficking networks transiting drugs from South America to the United States.57 
The term drug trafficking, a type of organized crime, and drug trafficking networks as 
used in this research refers to traffickers engaged in the transnational logistical network 
                                                 
55 World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, “Crime and Violence in Central America: A 
Developmental Challenge,” (2011), ii. 
56 World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, “Crime and Violence in Central America,” 
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57 World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, “Crime and Violence in Central America, 
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that transits illegal drugs from source to supply zones. Gangs in both El Salvador and 
Guatemala have been known to sell drugs locally within their respective communities and 
are also users of illegal drugs, but they are not viewed as being a critical part of the 
larger, structured organized crime of drug trafficking.58  
Studies have shown distinct correlations between drug trafficking and violent 
crime rates, particularly in Guatemala. A 2007 UNODC report found that highest murder 
rates in Guatemala are in the Escuintla, Peten, and Izbal provinces. Each of these 
provinces has murder rates higher than the most urban and populated province of 
Guatemala. The report notes that “Izabal and Peten are about 70% rural, and all three 
high-violence provinces have been implicated in drug trafficking.59 In addition, large 
indigenous populated provinces tend to have lower violent death rates as well.60 A 2011 
World Bank report sited similar data from a study by Cuevas and Demombynes, which 
used econometric models to analyze crime levels. The study revealed, “drug trafficking is 
an important driver of homicide rates. Within any one country, controlling for other 
factors, drug-trafficking hotspots have murder rates more than double those in areas of 
low trafficking intensity.61 In recent years, due to increased pressure from Mexican 
security forces Mexican drug cartels, specifically the Los Zetas, have reportedly 
expanded their operations into northern Guatemala, a less secure and more permissive 
environment.62  This expansion of operations has contributed to Guatemala’s overall 
homicide rates.  
The World Bank has cited several reasons for the correlation between drug 
trafficking networks and their use of violence. The organizations are illegal businesses 
operating on the black market and there is no judiciary system to settle disputes between 
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59 UNODC, “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire,” (May 2007), 55. 
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organizations, and violence is often used as a “disciplinary tool” or to settle 
disagreements. Additionally, competition over markets, trafficking routes, and territory 
also spur violence.63  
Similar to Guatemala, provinces known for drug trafficking in El Salvador have 
higher homicide rates than the more urban areas where gangs are present. According to 
UNDOC report, in 2005, “La Libertad and Sonsonate, two of the best developed 
provinces, show higher murder rates than San Salvador, the most urbanized province. 
These two provinces host the only major ports on the Pacific coast near the border with 
Guatemala and are connected to the Pan American Highway, both conduits for drug 
flows.”64  
Drug traffickers usually seek the most permissive environments, the lack of 
security presence in these rural areas make it an attractive environment for their 
operations, and likely leads to the increased homicide rates in these provinces. Guatemala 
has more rural areas than El Salvador. Additionally, to be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, Guatemala has less state security forces, than El Salvador. Most literature 
from academics and international and law enforcement agencies, point to Guatemala as 
being a more prominent country for drug trafficking than El Salvador. The 2011 World 
Drug Report lists Guatemala as the one of the highest ranking (number 15) countries for 
cocaine seizures. In 2009, it seized 6.9 metric tons.65 During the same year, El Salvador 
seized approximately 4 metric tons.66 It also highlights that in 2008 and in 2009 
Guatemala had extremely high cannabis plant seizures, 10.8 million and 
4.3 million, respectively.67 The 2011 World Drug Report does not provide specific data 
for El Salvador, but a 2012 INCSR report states that El Salvadoran Civilian National 
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Police (PNC) seized 1 metric ton of cannabis in 2011.68 The 2011 World Drug Report 
also listed Guatemala as a main manufacturer of ecstasy and pseudoephedrine.69 The lack 
of drug seizures in El Salvador does not provide confirmation on the absence or scarcity 
of drug trafficking activity; however, it suggests that Guatemala has more of problems 
with drug traffickers when compared to El Salvador.  
If, as the data suggests, drug trafficking is more prevalent in Guatemala, than in 
El Salvador, and the available data on homicides depict cities and provinces known for 
drug trafficking to be more violent and deadly than those with gangs, the likely 
conclusion is that Guatemala would be more deadly than El Salvador. However, this is 
not the case. This helps to eliminate drug trafficking as a reason for consistently higher 
homicides rates in El Salvador. 
3. Defining Organized Crime 
While drug trafficking is a major type of organized criminal activity, there are 
other types of organized crime that exists separate from the illegal drug industry. 
Organized crime syndicates and networks are profit-driven organizations.70 They are 
often transnational in nature and include illegal activities such as weapons trafficking, 
trafficking in persons, smuggling migrants, kidnapping, and money laundering. A major 
problem in how organized crime fuels violence in the Central America is how it 
undermines government and law enforcement institutions and fosters corruption. Due to 
the illicit nature, similar to drug trafficking networks, organized crime syndicates use 
violence to intimidate, settle disputes, and to keep their activities clandestine.  
Guatemala has a serious problem with organized crime. Reportedly, organized 
criminal syndicates have contacts and agents operating with law enforcement, the judicial 
system, and national legislature. Corruption is rampant throughout these state institutions. 
In 2007, WOLA Program Director Geoff Thale stated, “nowhere in Central America are 
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the problems of organized crime and drug trafficking more evident than in Guatemala.”71 
Due to problems with high levels of corruption and the legitimate fear by prosecutors to 
enforce the law and seek justice, at the request of the Government of Guatemala the 
United Nations formed an International Commission against Impunity In Guatemala 
(CICIG), to investigate illegal security groups and clandestine activity within 
Guatemala.72  The request for an external, international organization to intervene to root 
out corruption and apply the law is an indicator of how deeply organized crime has 
penetrated the state. 
It is unknown exactly how many homicides per year can be contributed to the 
activities of organized crime. These figures are often lumped together with those caused 
by drug trafficking organizations making it difficult to separate the two. However, it is 
apparent that it is a critical problem that hinders public security in Guatemala. 
El Salvador also has its problems with organized crime. In addition to the drug 
traffickers operating in country, the state has problems with money laundering, weapons 
trafficking, and human smuggling.73 However, the literature and discussion of organized 
crime El Salvador is not as widely discussed or thought to be as deeply rooted as it is in 
Guatemala.  
B. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime each contribute to violent crime 
rates in Guatemala and El Salvador.  Obtaining concrete data to better analyze the 
situations in these countries remain problematic, however the current data suggests that 
drug trafficking presents the bigger threat than street gangs. Gangs are a serious problem 
in these countries, but the data suggests that they have been erroneously blamed and used 
as a scapegoat as the leading reasons for increased homicide rates in Central America. 
According to the statistics, drug trafficking and organized crime are a larger threat to 
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human life, proving that some criminal activity is more deadly than others. In comparing 
the types of criminal activity most prevalent in El Salvador to what is prevalent in 
Guatemala, Guatemala should in all likelihood have higher homicide rates, but it does 
not.  Through examining this data it helps to eliminate “type of crime” as a reason for 
higher El Salvadoran homicide rates. The next chapter will examine the competency, 








III. A LOOK AT SECURITY INSTITUTION CAPACITY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS IN EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
Institutional theory in political science leads us to reason that a state with strong, 
stable institutions is better able to govern and maintain political and public order within 
its society.  The application of this theory and reasoning is frequently applied in 
reconstruction and peacekeeping efforts by international organizations and coalitions in 
the aftermath of post-conflict situations, specifically in war torn states in which the pre-
existing government institutions have collapsed or in which the government and security 
forces are blamed for committing severe human rights abuses during civil conflicts. One 
of the main focal points of reconstruction becomes establishing legitimate government 
institutions.74 The idea is that legitimate institutions would lead to a stable, functioning 
government and maintain order within society.75 The application of this concept has been 
repeated in numerous post-conflict situations. From state reconstruction after World War 
II during the late-1940s to reestablishing government organizations and institutions in 
post-war Iraq in the 2000s, there has been an emphasis on rebuilding institutions in post-
conflict situations. A 2007 Organization for Economic and Development (OECD) 
guideline titled Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and 
Situations, states the “long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to 
help national reformers to build effective, legitimate and resilient state institutions, 
capable of engaging productively with their people to promote sustained development.”76 
In theory and application, state institutions are important. A solid institution, whether 
political, economic, or public, establishes operating norms and principles, creates an 
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organizational structure, formalizes procedures, sets the rules for conducting business, 
develops legitimacy with the people and the government, and exerts influence in a 
society.  
Conventional wisdom leads to reason that states with more capable or stronger 
institutions, specifically security and judicial institutions are better poised to maintain 
public security and protect citizen’s rights than states with weaker, lesser-equipped 
institutions. However, while the Salvadoran peace process and implementation of 
institutional security reform was more successful than Guatemala, El Salvador’s post-war 
security sector has been less successful at preventing violent deaths within its society. 
Notably, the United Nations’ work in El Salvador has been recognized as one of its most 
effective post-conflict operations.77 Specific to the implementation of domestic security 
reform, the United Nations views it as “the most far-reaching and important public 
security reform in Latin America.”78 Contrary to El Salvador, the Guatemalan peace 
accord for security was “superficially sweeping in its scope, was not specific enough to 
provide an operational framework for substantive reforms and for evaluation of reforms 
by the United Nations.”79  An interesting point is how Guatemala’s peace accords were 
finalized four years after El Salvador, but the United Nations and international 
community provided less scrutiny and more leeway in the Guatemalan process, despite 
Guatemala’s civil war lasting three times longer and resulting in two and a half times 
more deaths. Overall, El Salvador’s post-war security and judicial institutions emerged 
better off than Guatemala. Today it possesses a stronger, more capable domestic security 
force.  
Reforming the existing security institutions and establishing new ones was as a 
critical part of the peace process and post-war reconstruction in both El Salvador and 
Guatemala. This chapter analyzes the specific peace accords, which created a new 
civilian national police force in both countries, and describes the transition and progress 
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each country has made since the civil wars. It agrees with scholars, theorists, and 
international organizations on the importance of reforming or building legitimate security 
and judicial institutions, particularly in post-war situations. However, the case of post-
war El Salvador and Guatemala seems to challenge the reasoning that stronger, 
consolidated domestic security institutions would translate into a safer society with fewer 
homicides. Yet, a careful analysis of the police forces in El Salvador and Guatemala and 
the corresponding post-war homicide rates over the last fifteen years provide proof to this 
claim. After El Salvador’s new police force was fully deployed in the 1990s, homicide 
rates began to decline. In contrast, Guatemala’s homicide rates were marked by a small, 
but steady increase.80 Leading one to reason there must be other factors impacting the 
state’s ability to combat crime.  The next chapter discusses the factors which have 
impacted security force effectiveness in El Salvador, but first this chapter lays the 
groundwork and explains the conditions under which the new institutions emerged and 
how they were developed.  
B. GUATEMALA 
1. Peace Process and the Establishment of the PNC 
Guatemala’s thirty-six year civil war between the government and guerilla forces, 
which stemmed tensions between social classes, came to an end by the signing of the 
final peace accord in December 1996. The entire peace agreement consisted of six major 
accords. The Framework Accord for the Resumption of the Negotiation Process 
established the United Nations as the lead mediator for negotiations and established the 
terms for peace process was signed in January 1994. In the 1980s, human rights 
violations, particularly against the indigenous populations, peaked to genocidal levels.81 
The Comprehensive Accord on Human Rights, effective immediately, was signed in 
March 1994. This accord was critical in allowing the United Nations to send a 
verification delegation into the country. Both the government and the Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), the umbrella group of guerilla forces, agreed to 
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uphold human rights as outlined in the state constitution. As historian, Susanne Jonas, 
notes the human rights accord did not eliminate human violations nor did it curve 
impunity, but what it did do was provide greater international attention to the domestic 
situation. It had a “dissuasive impact.”82 The next major accord to be signed was the June 
1994 Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by Armed Conflict. It addressed 
resettlement plans for refugees and displaced persons to return to Guatemala after the 
war. The June 1994 Historical Clarification Commission accord was created to 
investigate and document activities that occurred up until the present time and provide 
recommendations on the best steps to take towards reconciliation. Unlike the El 
Salvadoran equivalent (Truth Commission), it did not “name names” or assign 
responsibilities and there were no recommended judicial consequences for those found 
guilty of committing criminal acts or human rights abuses. 83 The Identity and Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Accord of March 1995 was instrumental in achieving national 
recognition of the indigenous population within Guatemala and granting them with civil 
and cultural rights. The next accord to be signed, the Social and Economic Aspects and 
Agrarian Situation, completed in May 1996 outlined steps to improve social and 
economic development throughout all sectors of the population, particularly those sectors 
that had been neglected. It prompted the government to spend more on social services 
such as education, health, and also outlined steps for limited land reform.  
The last major accord, the Strengthening of Civilian Power and Role of the 
Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (Demilitarization Accord), signed in September 
1996 was arguably the most important. It set the stage for a major transition within the 
Guatemalan state. It redefined the role and functions of the armed forces, removing it 
from a political, domestic security and intelligence role and limiting it to territorial 
defense.84  It is important to recognize the extent to which the military had previously 
dominated Guatemalan politics and society to fully understand the potential impact the 
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accord would have in transforming the internal security structure of the state. It is equally 
important to be aware of the impact the military’s domestic security role had on society, 
particularly with indigenous populations, to understand why it was important for the post-
war police forces consist of newly trained civilians.  
For most of the twentieth century the military had been a dominant player in 
Guatemalan politics and society. For a combined period of fifty-eight years during the 
twentieth century, military governments had ruled in Guatemala. This was more years 
than any other country in Latin America.85 The military had obtained the presidency 
through various means, to include coup d’états, by running for office in democratic 
elections, and through selection by appointment during transition periods. Even through 
regime changes—dictatorship to authoritarianism to democracy—the military continued 
to yield considerable political influence. As an institution, the military was one of the 
most powerful organizations in the country. 
Among its Central American neighbors, Guatemalan citizens endured the longest, 
deadliest, and most brutal civil war. An estimated 200,000 civilians were killed, 
1.5 million displaced, and thousands disappeared. The majority of violence and brutality 
was inflicted on the Mayan and indigenous population in rural areas, and it reached 
genocide levels in the early 1980s.86 During the civil war, the government of Guatemala 
allotted the military with increased authority and latitude to repress and defeat leftist 
guerilla groups. The government and the majority of the business elite sector supported 
increased military control and authority because it protected their bureaucratic and 
economic interests.87 An official post-war investigation into human rights abuses by the 
Archbishop’s Human Rights Office attributed over 85% of war crimes to the Guatemalan 
army and associated paramilitary forces.88 These factors made demilitarization and the 
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subjection of the military to civilian leadership a critical component of the post war peace 
process.89 It set the stage for a new chapter to be written in Guatemalan civil-military 
relations. In addition to a change in constitution to limit the armed forces’ role to external 
defense, specifics of the Strengthening of Civilian Power and Role of the Armed Forces 
in a Democratic Society Accord included:  
 Disbanding of rural forces under military control (specifically, the Mobile 
Military Police and the Voluntary Civil Defense Committees). 
 Creation of a new police force, the National Civilian Police (PNC), under 
authority of the Public Ministry, to replace the existing National Police 
and other specialized forces. 
 Increasing the number of police from 12,000 to 20,000 within three years, 
along with significant salary increases. 
 Participation of local communities in the recruitment and selection of 
personnel, such that the PNC would reflect the diversity of Guatemalan 
society 
 Establishment of laws to regulate private security firms and place control 
of arms possession under police authority 
 Establishment of a civilian intelligence department in the Ministry of 
Interior, and creation of congressional oversight mechanisms for all 
intelligence agencies. 
 Creation of commissions to study the country’s system for the 
administration of justice and make recommendations for its 
modernization.90  
The demilitarization accord has been described as the cornerstone of the entire 
peace process.91 It had the potential to reform and transform the state’s security 
institutions, and it paved the way to shift the military’s power, which it had wielded for 
much of the century, into civilian hands.  
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2. Implementation of the Peace Accords 
Despite the hopefulness of what was written in the demilitarization accord, 
implementation did not occur as anticipated. Overall, the demilitarization accord was 
only partially successful in Guatemala. While it goes beyond the extent of this section to 
provide an in depth explanation on the causal factors for this partial success—as the 
major focus is to examine the outcome in Guatemala in order to compare it to El 
Salvador—it is important to highlight several factors that derailed full implementation of 
the accord in order to provide an understanding of the post-war climate in which 
institutional reform took place.  
3. Creation of the New PNC 
The initial steps taken by the government of President Alvaro Arzu (1996-2000) 
to reform the new security situation appeared promising. The new police academy began 
training new recruits, police salaries increased, the government purchased new equipment 
for the police force, and there was an increased presence of police forces throughout the 
country.92  However, there were several problems as well. In creating the new PNC, the 
armed forces were supposed to be removed from a domestic security role. However, the 
language contained in the demilitarization accord allowed government officials a 
considerable amount of flexibility. This flexibility allowed the system to be manipulated, 
and resulted in the formation of a substandard force. From his research on post-civil war 
Guatemala, scholar William Stanley provided a good summary on the recruiting criteria 
of the new police forces.  In an article, he comments that: 
The proposed changes in the police lack crucial details: no standards are 
set for educational background or other qualities of recruits to the new 
force; no distinction is made in the amount of training for officers as 
distinct from basic recruits; no limits are set on the proportion of the new 
force that can be made up of recycled members of existing police forces; 
no standards or mechanisms are proposed for vetting former security 
forces members seeking entry into the new force, in order to eliminate 
candidates with records of human rights abuses, corruption or criminality; 
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no details are included regarding organization or doctrine of the new force, 
nor of the content of training; no reference is made to internal or external 
disciplinary mechanisms.93 
With a history of corruption and human rights abuses, it can easily be argued that 
Guatemala required a much more detailed plan and more specific guidelines in the 
creation of its PNC.  
The accord defined a four-year timeline for the reforms to be implemented and 
new institutions established. Within this timeframe it called for the training of 20,000 
police members. In efforts to “train” more police officers and meet quotas suggested in 
the accord, academy standards were lowered and the training pipeline shortened.94 The 
government was not simply concerned with appearances, but also with rising crime. 
During the mid to late-1990s, crime in Central America began to increase drastically. The 
lack of security in the states recovering from civil wars made the region a ripe, porous 
environment for illegal activity—illicit trafficking, organized crime, and the formation of 
gangs. Domestic pressure to respond to the crime also influenced the government’s 
decisions to push new police officers through the system. As an additional consequence, 
or perhaps excuse, old police officers and soldiers, from the civil war period, remained in 
the “new” civilian police, and many were not re-trained to the new standards.95 The 
police force did not reach the proficiency levels as outlined in the accords. 
4. Armed Force Reduction 
The language outlined in the accord left substantial flexibility and loopholes for 
old practices to continue. A stipulation in the demilitarization accord called for a 
reduction in the armed forces by one-third its standing force size. Within a year, the 
military complied with this stipulation reducing its force structure from 46,900 to 31,423 
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members.96 In the years following, further reductions were made and the force structure 
decreased to approximately 15,500 in the early 2000s.97 Yet, the majority of cuts were 
made at the lower levels of the rank structure and by stopping recruitment efforts. The 
accords did not specify how and where the cuts were to be made, which allowed senior 
officials flexibility.98 So while the military “returned to the barracks” the senior rank 
structure remained intact.99  Additionally, military personnel were not fully purged from 
its role of policing functions.  
5. Resistance and Impunity 
Of note, the resistance of right-wing government officials, and former military 
members to fully embrace the language in the accords posed a major obstacle to security 
reform. Impunity was (and remains) a major factor. Some of the most senior officials 
suspected of human rights abuses and criminal activity during the civil war period remain 
in the government, military, and in the political arena today. A prime example is General 
Rios Montt, president of Guatemala from 1982–1983, when a large number of military-
led massacres took place on Mayan villages. He has remained in Guatemalan politics 
since the civil war, and because he was a congressman, he has been shielded with 
impunity. Remarkably in 2003, Montt was cleared to run for the presidential office by the 
Guatemalan courts.100  In January 2012, he stepped down from the Guatemalan congress, 
and was finally ordered to stand trial for genocide and other crimes committed during the 
civil war.101 
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A factor that significantly weakened the effectiveness of the peace accords was 
the failure of the citizens to approve the accords and incorporate it into constitutional law. 
This failure essentially, allowed the accords to become recommendations as opposed to 
requirements. The civil war concluded in December 1996, and provided a four-year 
timeframe for implementation. The reforms outlined in the negotiated accords were to 
first be approved by the Guatemalan Congress and later voted on by the citizens of 
Guatemala in a referendum. Despite the call for change by the majority of citizens, when 
it came time to vote, there was only an 18% turnout among registered voters, and the 
referendum was not passed.102 The low voter turnout has been attributed to manipulation 
by elite right wing politicians within the government.103 In describing the significance of 
the constitutional reforms, Jonas states the “reforms were the linchpin of the entire peace 
process…[they] could unblock, assure, and consolidate change in the most crucial areas 
of the accords.”104 The proposed constitutional referendum was critical to limiting the 
armed forces role to external defense only. Unfortunately, the reform process was 
“hijacked” and the military was able to maintain many of its pre-civil war roles, and the 
government was able to avoid legal accountability for instituting proposed reforms. 
C. EL SALVADOR 
1. Peace Process and the Establishment of the PNC 
El Salvador’s civil war, which began in 1980 as a result of political and economic 
tensions, lasted for a decade before the United Nations intervened to begin peace 
negotiations between government forces and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front (FMLN). The two sides had reached a stalemate. It resulted in an estimated 75,000 
deaths and over 1.5 million people being displaced, the majority of whom fled the 
country. Negotiations concluded and the civil war ended with the signing of the 
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Chapultepec Accords in 1992.105 United Nations involvement “played an unprecedented 
and critical role in peace-building in El Salvador, verifying the implementation of the 
peace accords, contributing to institution building, and mediating to overcome a number 
of significant crisis that arose during implementation.”106 Stanley notes the United 
Nations and international community provided greater scrutiny and particulars in the 
creation of the El Salvadoran National Civilian Police force than it applied in 
Guatemala.107 The majority of the Peace accord focused on transforming the security 
institutions within the state. Highlights included the establishment of the FMLN as a 
legitimate political party, the creation of a new National Police Force, a constitutional 
change that redefined and reorganized the role of the armed forces to focus on defense of 
state sovereignty, and an outline for new security and judicial policies. Unlike the 
Guatemalan experience to commence two years later, the Salvadoran accords have been 
praised the on the level of detail and scrutiny applied towards the building of new state 
security institutions.108 Scholars and analysts praise the United Nations peacekeeping and 
institution-building efforts in El Salvador. An example comes from analysis by scholars, 
William Stanley and David Holiday. They state, “Of the UN’s internal peacemaking 
efforts since the end of the Cold War, its work in El Salvador stands out as the most 
unambiguously successful.”109 This contrasts with the implementation of the peace 
process in Guatemala, which was more lax and less scrutinized. 
The Salvadoran peace accords consisted of three major agreements between the 
FMLN and the government. The Human Rights Accord was first to be signed in July 
1990. It allowed the United Nations to send a verification mission into country, the 
United Nations Verification Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), to monitor fighting. The 
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next major accord signed in April 1991 was the Commission on Truth for El Salvador 
that established a commission mandated to investigate serious acts of violence from the 
beginning of the conflict to present and to provide recommendations for national 
reconciliation. In addition, the commission was to recommend legal, political, and 
administrative actions to be taken based upon its findings.110 The third agreement to be 
signed was the New York Agreement and Compressed Negotiations signed in September 
1991. This last agreement was critical to ending the civil war. It established a 
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), which would be responsible for 
verifying the implementation of the political agreements. It reduced force size and 
redefined the role of the armed forces to the defense of sovereign territory, disbanded the 
National Guard and the Treasury Police, and created a new National Civilian Police 
(PNC) to be in charge of public security. Of note, it also specified new training 
requirements and standards for both the armed forces and the new PNC. Both sides also 
agreed to a purification process to be carried out by a newly created Ad Hoc 
Commission. This commission would investigate and review the performance of 
members of the armed forces, and make legal and administrative recommendations as to 
whether or not these service members were suitable continue service in the armed forces 
in the new democracy.  It also addressed socioeconomic issues, such as land reform.111 
The New York Agreement and Compressed Negotiations was the key agreement to 
establish and redefine the security institutions in El Salvador. 
2. Implementation of the Peace Accords 
Although El Salvador’s government pushed back on the several of the prescribed 
institutional reforms, there was eventually a general acceptance of the framework to 
transform the security and intelligence organizations.  
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3. Creation of the New PNC 
The new police force was to include an equal combination of former police 
officers and FMLN guerrillas, 20% each, as well as new civilian recruits. All members of 
the new force were to undergo training at the new National Academy of Public 
Security.112 While the training and equipping of the new police forces moved slowly at 
first, increased criminal activity throughout Central America in the 1990s prompted the 
Armando Sol administration (President of El Salvador 1994–1999) to expedite fulfillment 
of the mandate.113 The activation of the new police forces did not take place without 
issues. The force as a whole has had to deal with crime and corruption among its 
members, and there have been reports of human rights abuses as well. However, overall it 
has been noted to operate at a much higher standard than the previous police forces, and 
has gone to the extent of arresting top-ranking officers that have been caught committing 
crimes.114 Scholar William Stanley, who has researched and written extensively on El 
Salvador civil war and post-war transition, provides a good summary on the outcome of 
the newly created institutions in noting that, “although the PNC’s performance was 
imperfect, particularly in the face of a massive post-ware crime wave, it was far more 
efficient, responsive, transparent, and accountable than the old police.”115  
4. Armed Forces Reduction 
Similar to the creation of the PNC, the military also fulfilled its post-war 
requirements. Prior to the civil war, El Salvador had experienced almost fifty years of 
direct military rule. The armed forces had dominated politics, society, and internal 
security.116  Its permeation and operations in society increased during the civil war. The 
armed forces committed severe human rights abuses to include large-scale massacres of 
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unarmed civilians.117  From their investigations the Ad Hoc Commission recommended 
the discharge of 103 officers, many who were in the High Command. While there was 
some resistance by the government, the armed forces eventually complied.  “Military 
officers, while apparently unrepentant about the human rights abuses committed by the 
army, generally seem to have accepted the new doctrine and the limited role of the armed 
forces as defined in the peace accords.” 118 The military relinquished its political role, and 
it even reduced its force size ahead of the agreed upon timeline. Overall, the peace 
negotiations were successful in transforming the military as an institution. However, the 
executive branch reserves the ability to call upon the military to support the PNC when it 
deems there is a national emergency that the PNC cannot handle alone. 
While most international organizations and scholarly literature reference the 
Salvadoran peace process as being successful, to be balanced, there are several criticisms 
worth noting. Most criticisms point to the failure of the accords to significantly address 
the socio-economic causes of the civil war. Poverty and inequality still plague the state 
today, and the government is criticized for not doing enough to address these economic 
problems.119 In terms of security reform, on several instances it took ONUSAL pressure 
to get the government to comply with new PNC criteria. For example, the Special 
Investigative Unit and the Anti-Narcotics units were left intact after the civil war and 
allowed to become branches of the new PNC. These old members were supposed to go 
through training, but in many instances members circumvented the training requirements. 
As a result, corruption and old practices began to expand into the PNC. In 1994, the 
government finally responded to ONUSAL pressure to reform these forces.120 In 
addition, similar to the Guatemalan PNC, the Salvadoran PNC has also been accused of 
human rights abuses. Another criticism of the security reform process has been the role of 
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the military in domestic security. Demilitarization was a major part of the peace accords. 
Yet increased crime rates have prompted several Presidential administrations to use the 
military to support the PNC in law enforcement functions.121  
D. PRESENT STATE OF SECURITY FORCES IN GUATEMALA AND 
EL SALVADOR 
There are several similarities in the Salvadoran and Guatemalan cases. In both 
pre-war El Salvador and pre-war Guatemala, the military dominated politics and was the 
primary enforcer of public security. The negotiated peace accords in both states created 
new democracies and the opportunity for significant transformation. Of main concern to 
this case study, it created civilian national police forces to assume the internal security 
function, and it limited the military’s primary role to defense of the respective sovereign 
territory. In establishing the new police force structure and standards, there was more 
oversight, stricter recruiting requirements, and better instruction provided at the 
El Salvadoran National Police Academy. The security building transformation process 
for Guatemala was less detailed, received lesser oversight, and was not implemented to 
the degree as seen in El Salvador. The creation of the Salvadoran PNC did not occur 
without complication, but the overall outcome was positive.  The point is not to criticize 
the United Nations process in Guatemala, but to highlight the different institutional 
outcomes in each country. 
It has been twenty years since the end of hostilities in El Salvador and sixteen 
years for Guatemala, and there have been several modifications in their respective police 
forces. Regional crime waves beginning in the 1990s and continuing through present day 
have strained state public security institutions. The next chapter will provide an overview 
of the PNCs performance from the peace process to present date. Recent studies show 
that El Salvador’s police force is still better trained, have greater capabilities, and 
institutionally stronger than Guatemala’s. Of note, it can easily be argued that there is 
much room for improvement within El Salvador’s security institution in terms of 
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efficiency and effectiveness when compared to advanced states, such as the United States 
and much of Western Europe. However, in the regional context of post-civil war states, 
El Salvador’s police force stands out. 
The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) conducted extensive research, 
interviews, and analysis on the current state of police forces in Central America. In 2009, 
the organization published “Protect and Serve? The Status of Police Reform in Central 
America.”122 Their findings provide current, useful data to measure the current state and 
capacity of the police forces in El Salvador and Guatemala.  
In El Salvador, the police academy is an independent, civilian-led institution and 
is completely separate from the PNC.  Instruction at the policy academy has been 
modified over the years to incorporate more real-world experiences to balance theoretical 
instruction. In order to join the El Salvadoran PNC, a recruit must be an El Salvadoran 
citizen, have completed high school, have no court record, never have been fired for 
disciplinary reasons from any official government or private institution, not have any 
tattoos or even scars from tattoos that have been removed, and receive approval from the 
Background Verification Unit, which was created to verify new recruit information and 
ensure they met police force requirements. 123  
In Guatemala, the police academy falls underneath the PNC.  A 2002 FLASCO 
report found that only 36% of existing police had graduated from high school, and many 
of the older police did not complete primary school. Approximately 60% of the police 
officers serving in the new Guatemalan PNC had served in the old police force.124 Its 
police academy almost closed due to an 80% budget cut between 2001–2002. A clear 
sign that it was not a priority. There is a background verification unit, but it lacks critical 
resources and staffing. However, the state has since made efforts to improve the quality 
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of recruits and quality of education. In order to join the Guatemalan PNC, a new recruit 
must have graduated from high school and have no criminal record.125  
The PNCs in both states have had their share of internal problems with 
misconduct among its members, such as corruption, human rights abuses, and even extra 
judicial killings. In 2000, the El Salvadoran Inspector General dismissed 10% of the force 
for misconduct.126 In Guatemala 20% of the police force was fired between 2004-2005 
for misconduct, which included crimes such as corruption, hijackings, drug trafficking, 
and extortion. A 2007 United Nations report states that, “Guatemala has stood as one of 
the worst examples of endemic police corruption.”127 Additional comparisons show that 
El Salvador currently has 362 police per 100,000 citizens while Guatemala has 119 per 
100,000 inhabitants.128 There are five times more private security guards in Guatemala 
than there are PNC members. This depicts an evident lack of confidence and trust in the 
PNC.129 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented that from its post-war creation to present day, the 
available data, analysis, and research indicate the security institution in El Salvador is 
much better poised to combat crime, than the security institution in Guatemala. The El 
Salvador PNC exceeds the Guatemala PNC in recruitment standards, level of education, 
training, and force size by percentage of population, and budget. In addition, the El 
Salvadoran PNC is deemed to be less corrupt. From an institutional capacity perspective, 
as outlined in this chapter, it would appear that El Salvador would be better at violent 
crime prevention and deterrence, but it is not. Reverting back to the central question for 
this research, why El Salvador has consistently had higher homicide rates than 
Guatemala, a lack of state security or police force capacity and capabilities has been 
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eliminated as a causal factor. From a higher level of analysis, it shows that institutional 
capacity does not guarantee effectiveness and efficiency. 
Police forces serve to maintain public order, act as a visible deterrence for crime 
prevention, and conduct investigations and gather evidence to prosecute criminals once 
arrested. However, there needs to be effective law and order, an effective police and 
judicial system. The next chapter will examine the laws, policy, and capacity of the 
judicial system in El Salvador and Guatemala to determine if they are contributing factors 




IV. MAKING INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS AND 
ESTABLISHING POLICY: THE CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN 
EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA 
A. TRANSITIONS  
Studies have shown post-war transitions such as a regime change or a major shift 
in the ruling political party can offer a unique opportunity for the establishment of new 
and reformed institutions. A regime transition opens a unique window in which decisions 
can be made to set a country on a particular trajectory. Existing organizations and 
policies can be dismantled and new ones can be created.130 The previous chapters 
explained the most common contributors to violent crime rates in post-civil war El 
Salvador and Guatemala and also described the creation and reformation of their 
respective state security institutions. This chapter takes the conditions described in the 
previous two chapters and places them on a time continuum. The signing of the peace 
accords in both states represented a “critical juncture” for change.131  El Salvador accords 
were finalized in 1992 and Guatemala in 1996. An increased crime rate in a post-war 
situation is common. However, the combination of the following factors created a 
particularly tenuous public security situation in both countries: a shift in drug trafficking 
routes, the demobilization of thousands of newly unemployed armed combatants, the 
deportation and migration of citizens and displaced persons, specifically young males 
with criminal backgrounds, and the availability of small arms leftover from the war, 
coincided with a post-war environment in which the previous public security forces were 
demobilizing.   
This thesis presents a two-fold argument. First it argues the decisions made in El 
Salvador during its post-war transition window caused its security forces to be behind the 
criminal wave that hit the region, and thus ill-prepared to enforce public security. It 
agrees with the importance on the establishment and investment in legitimate, 
                                                 
130 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor 
Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
131 Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 27. 
 48
professional, civilian-led domestic security institutions, but in the case of El Salvador, 
while the state and international organizations were focused on institution building, 
society was overtaken by a phenomenal crime wave, and thus it made it increasingly 
difficult for the newly trained PNC to “play catch up” once deployed. In contrast to El 
Salvador, Guatemala’s old security forces maintained a presence on the streets as they 
expedited new recruits and cycled existing members through the newly established 
training pipeline. However, the slow start of the new public security force did not doom 
the state to a condition of consistently high homicide rates, but subsequent repression 
policies undertaken by administrations to curb violent crime proved to be counter-
productive.  
While variation in institution building set the two cases on a different path, in 
both cases we see social and media forces encouraging mano dura type policies to reduce 
crime and violence. The second part of the argument is that public perception and citizen 
demands to address high crime rates prompted politicians to undertake repressive 
measures instead of investing in social and structural issues, which many scholars agree 
are the actual root causes of the crime.132 Citizens demanded direct results and these calls 
for action prompted administrations to invest more resources into short-term, visible 
tactics and policies instead of longer term, more effective preventive programs. Despite a 
reformed and more professional public security force than that of the pre-war period, 
Salvadoran security policies inadvertently attributed to increased homicide rates. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court and judiciary branch of the government did not provide 
the necessary checks and balances on policies that lessened human rights. Instead legal 
prudence and protection of human rights, gave way to partisan preferences. Recent 
elections have shown politicians who favor a hard line approach against crime tend to get 
elected to office.  
Like citizens in El Salvador, those in Guatemala also called for government action 
to combat crime. During the early 2000s, Guatemala, like other Central American states, 
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also sought to decrease criminal activity and engaged in repressive measures. However, 
after the implementation of these tactics there was a notable increase in homicide rates in 
both El Salvador and Guatemala.  For clarity, the argument is not that lenient security 
policies and laws will result in a decrease in violent crime rates, but conversely, the 
evidence has shown that hardline policies only serve to exacerbate the situation. One of 
the major differences in these two cases is Guatemala’s post-war transition began a few 
years after El Salvador, but it was actually the El Salvadoran police forces that got a late 
start on combating crime. Although Guatemala had a less detailed and monitored peace 
accord process and is overall “under-institutionalized,” the decision to “push” new 
recruits through the training pipeline and onto the streets most likely contributed to lower 
homicide rates in the country. The government’s reasons for doing so are not all 
altruistic, but with a similar crime wave impacting both states during their transition 
periods, Guatemala’s homicide rates were much lower during this critical juncture.  
This chapter describes the critical juncture period in both El Salvador and 
Guatemala and demonstrates how the decisions made during this timeframe impacted 
their initial ability to prevent crime and also how it impacted the longer-term institutional 
effectiveness of its police forces. In addition, it discusses the impact mano dura or iron 
fist type policies have had on crime rates and within society.  
B. CRITICAL JUNCTURES 
This chapter employs a critical juncture, path dependent framework, common 
within the tradition of historical institutionalism. In describing regime changes, scholar 
James Mahoney characterizes a critical juncture as a “choice point when a particular 
option is adopted from among two or more alternatives,” and “once a particular option is 
selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when 
multiple alternatives were still available.”133 He explains how at these critical junctures 
institutions and institutional arrangements are formulated. Mahoney summarizes his 
approach as follows,  
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A path-dependent approach emphasizes how actor choices create 
institutions at critical moments, how these institutions in turn shape 
subsequent actor behaviors, and how these actor responses in turn 
culminate in the development of new institutional patterns.134  
Using Mahoney’s definition as a starting point, the peace negotiation process in 
each state served as a critical juncture for transforming many of the state’s institutions. 
The military had dominated the security and political arena in each country for several 
decades, and the establishment of the peace accords created a unique window for change. 
The creation of these institutions was not left up to domestic actors alone. As described in 
the previous chapter, the United Nations served as the lead mediator in both countries, 
and the peace accords were established based on negotiations between the government 
and insurgent forces.  Of particular concern to this argument is the demobilization of old 
security forces and the creation and deployment of the new Civilian National Police 
(PNC). The new PNCs would be the primary state institution responsible for maintaining 
social order and the institution which “provide [d] the basic conditions to make 
governance possible” in the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic 
one.135 Because the previous forces were more experienced in political repression instead 
of crime prevention and investigative techniques, the establishment of a new police 
academy was a critical component in both peace accords.136  
Of note, there was resistance to change in the formulation of these new forces in 
both states. By far, El Salvador’s security institutional reformation process was more 
successful than Guatemala’s, but it is not without criticism. As an example it took 
international pressure in El Salvador to make the government allocate the necessary 
resources for the new academy. However, the government eventually complied.137 The 
El Salvadoran accord called for the demobilization of two-thirds of the existing police 
forces, and provided a two-year time frame (1992–1994) for the phased deployment of 
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5,940 new police members.138 As an interim measure, the accords created a CIVPOL 
organization responsible for monitoring the old police force during the transition phase. 
Another interim measure was the deployment of Transitory Auxiliary Police (PAT), a 
cadet force, to previous conflict zones. The first batch of cadets in El Salvador underwent 
a six-month training program and graduated from the academy in February 1993.139  
While the accords called for a two-year phased deployment of the PNC, it called 
for a more immediate, ten-month demobilization of FMLN forces.140 In addition, the 
required a 50% reduction of the armed forces was to occur within the same year. This 
resulted in the demobilization and unemployment of over 60,000 combatants 
(government and guerilla forces combined).141 The lack of police forces on the streets 
coinciding with a large demobilization of forces created a huge gap in public security 
between 1992 and 1994. Furthermore, approximately 80% of the deployed PNC were 
newly trained, inexperienced police officers. The accords had a detailed plan for El 
Salvador, but in hindsight, the interim police force proved to be insufficient to prevent 
and respond to crime in its early years. The outcome was a huge increase in violent 
crime. Charles T. Call refers to this specific situation as the “transaction costs of security 
reform.”142 While the numbers are estimates, reported homicides more than doubled 
during this time frame, going from 3,229 in 1992 to 7,673 in 1994.143  
Unlike in El Salvador, Guatemala did not complete stand down of its police force 
for institution building purposes. This decision had two consequences. In the short term, 
there was no sharp increase in post-war violence. However, in the long term it missed a 
critical window to purge the old forces and develop a more professional, better-trained 
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forces, which would be better at combating crime over the years. For reasons unknown, 
the United Nations-led peace accord process for Guatemala was less detailed and 
contained fewer requirements than what took place in El Salvador, just two years prior. 
Once completed the accord guidelines for the creation of the new PNC and training 
academy did not call for the demobilization of existing police forces before the newly 
trained PNC forces deployed.144 This was listed as a requirement in the Salvadoran 
accords. Government officials in Guatemala had the benefit of observing the situation in 
neighboring El Salvador and learned from it. The incumbent Guatemalan Interior 
Minister, Rodolfo Mendoza, (1996–2000) noted the “security vacuum” created by police 
reform in neighboring El Salvador and was convinced that Guatemala should not take the 
same path.145  Scholar William Stanley notes Guatemalans learned “they should rapidly 
deploy the new PNC by recycling existing police, and aim to deploy large numbers in a 
short period of time.”146 And that is what they did.  
In addition, Guatemala shortened the length of time required for training by 
pushing more recruits through the system at a faster rate. For example, old police 
members who remained on the force were supposed to go through a 24-week recycling 
course. In actuality, these old members finished the course in 6 weeks.147 The 
government of Guatemala was given four years to train and deploy 20,000 police 
officers. At this time, this seemed to be a far-reaching goal, but the Alvaro Arzu 
administration (1996-2000) put forth extreme efforts to meet the time line, and bt1999 
there were 17,339 deployed police members. In terms of experience level, over 60% were 
members of the old National Police force and Treasury Guard. 148 Also of note for 
Guatemala is that there were fewer demobilized combatants. Similar to El Salvador, 
crime rates in Guatemala were already high during its civil war, but it did not see the 
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post-war spike in homicide rates as that which occurred in El Salvador. Police presence 
alone does not guarantee the absence of violent criminal activity, but in the post-war 
transition phase the evidence suggests that it acted as deterrence, and kept homicide rates 
from spiraling out of control.  
The post-war demobilization plan, training pipeline for the PNC, and decisions 
made on the transitional police forces created a critical juncture for both states. The 
critical juncture set El Salvador on a path to have a more professional security system in 
the long run, but in the short term it created a security vacuum, and homicides and other 
crimes increased dramatically. Even after the actions taken during Guatemala’s critical 
juncture of police reform eased the transition  
The El Salvadoran police force could not change its demobilization plan and 
revert back to the use of old security forces once they were dismissed. Even if the 
government desired to do so, it was monitored by ONUSAL and received pressure from 
other international agencies to stick with the agreed upon peace accords. Guatemala was 
fortunate to witness what happened in El Salvador and make decisions to alter its course.  
Seven years after the accords, the El Salvadoran PNC reached force strength of 
18,000 officers and was successful at creating specialized forces within the organization 
to handle different types of crime.149 In terms of training and professionalism, the longer-
term effect was that El Salvador’s new security forces received better training and were 
more equipped in terms of resources, but the immediate impact was that it started down a 
path in which it was chasing high homicide and crime rates.  For Guatemala, this juncture 
produced an opposite effect.  More security forces on the streets during the post-war 
transition helped to contain crime rates, but in the long term its security apparatus has 
suffered from higher rates of corruption and are less professional and skilled than the El 
Salvadoran PNC. 
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C. THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME 
Guatemala has a major problem with drug trafficking and organized crime and 
corruption. Several reports point to hidden powers or grupos clandestinos, described as 
criminal-military groups, that operates both within the government and illicit 
organizations in the state. The Government is ill equipped to confront these 
organizations. Legitimate law enforcement officers and judges fear death or retaliation if 
they carry out the law. In 2008, the International Commission Against Impunity in 
Guatemala, or CICIG) designed by the United Nations at the bequest of the government 
of Guatemala, became operational in efforts to investigate and assist the Guatemalan 
officials in prosecuting high level organized criminals and drug traffickers operating 
within the state. It also has a severe problem with drug trafficking along its northern 
border, the PNC does not have the institutional capacity (members, resources, equipment) 
to patrol and defend these zones. The government has called on the military to assist in 
repelling Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating inside Guatemalan 
territory.150  
The El Salvadoran PNC has had an anti-narcotics division (DAN) since its 
formation, and in 2002 the state adopted a National anti-Drug Strategy, a six-year plan 
with a focus on the prevention, treatment and illicit trafficking. The El Salvadoran 
government has partnered with the United States and other states on drug interdiction 
efforts. Despite the existing data, which reveals higher homicide rates in drug trafficking 
zones as opposed to urban areas, and the statistics revealing that gang members 
contribute to a smaller portion of homicides, El Salvador policies and resources to stem 
violent crime over the years have disproportionally been focused on gangs.  
D. COMMONALITIES ACROSS THE CASES 
A commonality across both cases was the decision to implement a hardline 
approach against crime, which specifically targeted and arrested gang members by the 
hundreds. Another commonality is that in both cases these policies failed, and only 
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served to exacerbate the crime situation. In El Salvador, the demand for action to quell 
violent crime prompted the government to deploy the military to support the phased 
deployments of the new police in its domestic security role. The government created joint 
task groups consisting of army soldiers and PNC members.151 A couple years after the 
Salvadoran PNC was fully deployed, homicide rates remained high, but leveled off and 
then began to decline.152 Figure 1 is a graphic depiction of the change in homicide rates 
for both El Salvador and Guatemala in the years following the signing of the respective 
peace accords. It shows a discernible decline for El Salvador once the PNC deployed, but 
a slow, but steady rise for Guatemala. 
 
Figure 1.   Homicide rates years after Peace Accords were signed (From UNODC 
Intentional Homicide Rates by Country from 1995–2010. El Salvador data 
for 1992 to 1994 from “Democratisation, War and State-building: 
Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador”153) 
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Yet, the public perception of crime and the feelings of vulnerability did not 
decrease with actual crime rates. This led to a sequence of events within El Salvadoran 
government and society.  
Real decline notwithstanding, the perception of an increase in crime had a 
direct effect in the political arena. It led to a combining of security policies 
with legislative reform that moved toward tougher sentences and broader 
coercive police powers.154  
According to Central American University Public Opinion Institute (IUDOP) surveys 
from 1993–1999 crime was the most pressing issue facing El Salvador.155 Real and 
perceived crime became the major topic for the government, politicians and subsequently 
gained the media spotlight. At the same time, during the mid-to-late 1990s, El Salvador’s 
judicial system began establishing new reforms to protect human rights and provide a 
more fair and balanced trial system. However these codes received criticism as being “too 
soft” on crime and as preventing the security forces from performing their duties.156 
Although the statistics on crime revealed that it had decreased, public surveys in the late 
1990s revealed an overwhelming majority thought the government needed to pass 
tougher legislation on crime. Additionally, the majority of the population thought the 
laws favored criminals.157 Similarly in Guatemala, a review of 2004 USAID survey 
results on crime and public insecurity found that, “while perceptions of insecurity are 
relatively high, actual crime victimization is much lower.”158  
Of note, the media also played a role in both states, contributing to the skewed 
perception on crime. A USAID study found,  
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Not all violence in Guatemala is considered equally worthy of media 
attention. The more visible crimes, such as gang violence, receive 
significantly more media attention than less visible violence such as intra-
familial violence…Organized crime, which arguably has much higher- 
attention than gang violence, the reluctance perhaps being a function of 
perceived and actual state involvement. This has two important 
consequences. First, the information the public receives through the print 
and broadcast media paints an inaccurate picture of violence in Guatemala 
—one in which gangs are seemingly responsible for a greater proportion 
of violence than they actually are. The resulting high visibility of gang 
violence in the public sphere, relative to other types of violence, 
contributes to high levels of fear and insecurity among citizens. Second, 
the portrayal of gang violence in the media has the unintended 
consequence of glamorizing violence to youth not yet in gangs as well as 
to gang members themselves.159 
These perceptions played a role in the formation of public security policy. Lack of 
faith in the security and judicial system coupled with exaggerated perceptions, led to the 
public outcry to confront crime, and paved the way for more repressive policies and 
measures from law enforcement. Citizens were willing to give up certain liberties in order 
to gain increased security.  
Another common factor across states is the ineptitude of the justice system to 
effectively or efficiently process or prosecute citizens arrested for crimes. Neither peace 
accord provided extensive reform for the judiciary branch of the government. Thus 
separating the judicial branch from the power of the executive has proven problematic in 
the post-war state. The United States has aided El Salvador in reforming its legal system, 
and there have been some successes. There have been some gains in reducing the power 
of the Supreme Court over the lower courts. These efforts have assisted in making the 
court system less biased, but the Supreme Court retains the power to select the judges in 
the lower courts. In the late-1990s, El Salvador shifted to an accusatory system, which 
gave defendants the right to be heard in a court of law. Previously, judges relied primarily 
on written evidence to issue rulings on cases.160 However, when it comes to prosecuting 
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criminals, the attorney general’s office does not have adequate resources or prosecutors 
to handle the caseloads. In addition, qualified defense attorneys are also lacking.161 This 
weakness became prevalent in 2003 when the government introduced the Mano Dura 
Plan. The weak judicial system was not prepared to process the hundreds of suspected 
criminals.162 The legal system as an entirety remains inefficient and ill resourced to deal 
with the high crime rates facing the country.163  
Guatemala’s judicial and legal system has a severe problem with corruption. A 
UN report states, “the list of examples of judicial and prosecutorial intimidation is 
seemingly endless.”164 Impunity is a major problem. Judges and prosecutors are 
commonly bribed or coerced, and some have even resigned in fear for their safety. The 
same report estimates that murderers have only a 2% chance of being tried for homicide. 
Recognition of these circumstances prompted the Colom administration to seek external 
help for the internal corruption problems and the “paralysis in the country’s justice 
system.” The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was 
established in 2008 and has assisted Guatemalan prosecutors in crime investigation and 
prosecution. CICIG efforts have mainly focused on prosecuting members of large 
organized crime networks, but it represents a critical step against impunity.165 Overall, 
the judicial systems in both countries do not work, and has done little to serve as 
deterrence against violent crime. 
E. ENTER MANO DURA 
Of note, the human migration of deported illegal immigrants from jails in the 
United States back to the streets of Central America came shortly after the newly trained 
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PNC was deployed in El Salvador, and coincided with the end of the Guatemalan civil 
war. In the mid-1990s, approximately 40,000 illegal immigrants per year, the majority of 
whom were young males and members of MS-13 and the 18th Street Gang in the United 
States, were being sent back to Central America.166 These migrants presented an 
additional public security issue for both El Salvador and Guatemala. Neither state had the 
capacity in terms of social welfare programs, integration programs, educational or 
employment opportunities to consume these individuals. Overall crime such as petty 
theft, robberies, property crime, and assault between youth gangs increased dramatically 
in the late-1990s; however actual homicide rates in El Salvador were decreasing.  
This study concentrates specifically on homicide trends, and as referenced in 
Chapter II, several studies on homicides in both countries revealed that gangs contribute 
to only a small portion (approximately 15%) of overall homicide rates in both states.167 
Yet, as the public demanded an increased response from the government, these gang 
members with their tattoos and other identifiers, became public enemy number one in the 
eyes of the media and was generally blamed for the majority of crimes, to include the 
high homicide rate. Although, Guatemala’s homicide rates were high in international 
standards, they were significantly lower than El Salvador’s, and interestingly the 
notoriety of the gang phenomena also became a dominant issue within its society as well.  
The focus on gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, led to more 
repressive measures within the respective states.168 In the early-2000s, the Francisco 
Flores administration (President of El Salvador from 1999–2004) began looking at 
alternative policies to address high crime rates. In 2003, the government issued the Mano 
Dura Plan or Iron First or Zero Tolerance Plan, and passed an “anti-maras law.” The plan 
was directly focused on the repression and dismantlement of gangs. Under this plan a 
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mere suggestion, such as having tattoos or wearing gang-associated paraphernalia 
warranted enough evidence to arrest an individual. Being a member of a gang had 
become a crime. 
The first Mano Dura plan lasted six months (October 2003-April 2004) and 
resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of 19,275 people. There was tension between the 
lower courts in El Salvador, whose judges viewed the law as a violation of human rights 
and unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court, which sided with the Executive branch. An 
overwhelming majority of these individuals were released due to a lack of evidence in 
which to apply the law.169 In addition, the state did not have the institutional capacity to 
process and “rehabilitate” these gang members once they were arrested.   
There is common agreement among scholars and analysts that mano dura policies 
in Latin and Central America have proven to be a failure.170, 171 Evidence from both El 
Salvador and Guatemala show these repressive policies to be ineffective. However, 
politically, the government is seen as doing something to combat crime. Academic Mo 
Hume argues that politicians sensationalize the gang threat in order to get elected as it 
provides a common enemy of the state.172 Despite the un-success of mano dura, Flores’ 
successor, Elias Antonio Saca (El Salvadoran President 2004–2009) promoted a Super 
Mano Dura Plan, which issued harsher sentences. Merely belonging to a gang was 
punished with between three and five years of prison penalty. In addition, revisions of 
Article 348 of the Criminal Code ordered between two and four years in prison for 
individuals or groups who disturbed public order, blocked streets or invaded/occupied 
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buildings, with the aim of criminalizing certain social protest demonstrations.173 In a 
study of the El Salvadoran Supreme Court and the role it took in applying security policy, 
academics Elena Barahona and Sebastian Lejarraga, outline the increasingly repressive 
and restrictive laws and policies enacted under the Flores and Saca administrations to 
confront gangs within the state.174 
Mano Dura in El Salvador had little result other than overpopulating prisons and 
hardening gang members. Most detrimental it focused resources away from the primary 
causes of homicide rates within the country and minimized social programs designed to 
address the root structural issues within society that leads to crime. Contrary to its goal, 
as shown in Figure 1, it resulted in increased homicide rates. Homicide rates in El 
Salvador increased from 56 per 100,000 in 2003 to 65 per 100,000 in 2004. The year 
prior to the adoption of the Mano Dura Plan the homicide rate was 47 per 100,000 in 
2002. There was a 38% increase in homicide rate within two years.175  
Unlike the mano dura policies in El Salvador, Guatemala did not institute 
statewide legislation criminalizing gang membership. However, in 2003 the Guatemalan 
PNC implemented Plan Escoba or “Broom Plan,” which had a similar goal of rounding 
up gang members. Guatemala did not have a government policy against gang members; 
nonetheless the PNC took this approach in efforts to dismantle gangs. However, the 
arresting police officers were then faced with the problem of finding a “legal” and 
legitimate reason for arresting an individual. A study found that in most instances the 
PNC used drug possession, sometimes planted by corrupt police officers, as a means for 
arrest.176 Similar to El Salvador, the plan did not have the desired impact. While in effect 
(June 2003-June 2004), of the approximately 10,500 people arrested there was only a 1% 
conviction rate. Plan Escoba only served to overpopulate the prisons, over-burden a weak 
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judicial system, and embolden those that had been arrested. Since 2004, Guatemala has 
not relied on mano dura methods to confront gang crime.177 Of note, the homicide rates 
in Guatemala only increased from 35 to 36 per 100,000 people between 2003 and 2004, 
but there was a notable increase in 2005 to 42 per 100,000. 178  
F. ALTERNATE INITIATIVES 
The majority of solutions and efforts to combat crime in both El Salvador and 
Guatemala have focused on suppression. In both states, the PNCs have become 
overwhelmed and this has led to the executive calling upon the military to assist in 
domestic security. The lack of educational and economic opportunities, poverty, and lack 
of social structure within the community serve as the foundational reasons why people 
get into a life of crime or join gangs.179 However, the underlying social and structural 
issues have taken a back seat to repressive measures issued by the state. There is a 
tendency for politicians to seek results while they are in office. Social changes and 
economic development and opportunities take time, but domestic pressures call for 
immediate responses.  
In fairness, there have been several initiatives within each country that has 
focused on the underlying social issues that lead to crime and violence. There are several 
non-governmental organizations within each country focused on education, crime 
prevention and rehabilitation for the disenfranchised.180 Targeted efforts such as 
community policing in some cities, offering youth scholarships, and creating employment 
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opportunities have had positive results. Yet, the majority of research depicts that these 
efforts are under-funded and receive less attention from policymakers.181 
G. EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME 
Critical Junctures represent an important window in which a state can dismantle, 
reform, and create institutions. The decisions made during this crucial timeframe have 
shown to have long term, lasting impacts. In comparing the two cases, at the creation of 
its new PNC, El Salvador followed the guidelines outlined in the negotiated peace 
accords and invested in training new recruits and developing a professional police force. 
In contrast, with the creation of its new PNC, Guatemala invested less in training and 
professionalism and concentrated more on getting the members out on the street. These 
decisions placed the institutions within these states on different paths, and resulted in El 
Salvador having an overall better police force than Guatemala. However, El Salvador 
paid a price. As it took time to build its institutions in the post war period, homicide rates 
skyrocketed forcing the newly trained PNC to employ into hostile conditions and work 
harder to quell the violence. However, a few years after the PNC was fully deployed, 
homicide rates began to stabilize and started to decline, but as they did public demands to 
address crime within the state along with media sensationalism of gangs, prompted 
government officials to focus extensively on dismantling the gang problem. In doing so, 
it overlooked other sources of violent crime and the hardline policies only served to 
exacerbate the crime problem within the state resulting in a rise in homicide rates, that 
were actually declining. As for Guatemala, it was able to avoid a post-war surge in 
homicide rates by not fully demobilizing its standing police force before the new force 
would be deployed. In addition, by pushing members through the system, it was able to 
rapidly increase the force size of the PNC. However, in terms of institutional capability 
and capacity, this decision set Guatemala on a path to have a less professional and 
capable force. In addition, by recycling a large number of the previous police forces, 
corrupt behavior subsisted. In terms of homicide rates, while it was able to avoid an 
initial surge, homicide rates have steadily increased.  
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Creating strong institutions is an important step in post war reconstruction, but 
strong institutions are not always indicative of a more orderly society. This case study 
reveals that institutional investment is critical, but the polices governments undertake are 
just as important. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS 
This thesis set out to explain why despite stronger institutional capability and 
capacity, El Salvador has consistently had higher homicide rates than neighboring 
Guatemala. The study concentrated on intentional homicide rates because it is a good 
indicator on the degree of public security in a city or country. While the data from most 
organizations such as the United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), and 
national police forces are estimated figures, there are sufficient data spanning decades to 
be used for trend analysis. Both states have problems with organized crime syndicates, 
drug trafficking organizations, and youth gangs. In review, there are more gang members 
in terms of percentage of population in El Salvador than there are in Guatemala. With 
respect to drug trafficking, reports such as the UN World Drug Report show Guatemala 
as having higher instances of drug trafficking, cultivation, and use than El Salvador.  In 
addition, analyses indicate the drug trafficking business to be a major cause of violent 
deaths. While gang members are often the scapegoat for phenomenally high violent crime 
rates, an important note on both countries is that several studies reveal gang members as 
only being responsible for approximately 15% of intentional homicides. These findings 
serve to eliminate the type of crime as being the reason for the substantially higher 
homicide rates in El Salvador. El Salvador has more gang members, but less drug 
traffickers, and those gangs reportedly only constitute a minor number of homicides.  
Both countries had brutal civil wars in which the United Nations (UN) intervened 
to broker peace negotiations between government and guerilla forces. For most of the 
twentieth century, the militaries maintained a dominant role within each state, and thus 
the peace process presented a crucial window for change. The two peace accords called 
for a substantial reduction in the size of the armed forces and the elimination of existing 
police and paramilitary guard forces. A cornerstone of both peace accords was the 
creation of a new Civilian National Police (PNC) force, which assumed responsibility for 
maintaining domestic order and protecting citizen rights. A study of the post-war security 
apparatuses in El Salvador and Guatemala reveal El Salvador as being significantly more 
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professional, consolidated, and capable than Guatemala. Of note, El Salvador is far 
behind much of the western world in terms of capability and the professionalism of its 
PNC has received some criticism, but a regional comparison shows it is better off than its 
neighbors. Yet, the El Salvadoran PNC and courts have been less capable at maintaining 
public order. 
Two major scholarly theories were examined in this case study. The first is the 
concept that strong institutions lead to a more orderly society. The second pertains to 
regime transitions and how institutional decisions made during the transition period can 
have a lasting impact. Tracing the development of the PNCs back to their creation, a 
major difference is seen in the decisions the governments made in the establishment and 
training of their police forces. The peace accord process and the immediate years that 
followed was a critical juncture for both states. El Salvador made short-term sacrifices for 
the longer-term gain. By investing more in the training and phased deployments of new 
recruits and largely adhering to the guidelines outlined in the peace accords, it resulted in 
the state having a better security force. Yet, demobilizing the old security force while 
taking the time to build the new one resulted in a security gap on the streets and violent 
crime rates increased dramatically. Taking the time to more effectively build the PNC 
showed to be a prudent decision. A few years after the forces were fully deployed 
homicide rates began to decline. However, an interesting intervening variable, which 
caused crime rates to rise once again, was media sensationalism and a slightly flawed 
public perception of crime. Gang members, undoubtedly contributed to the overall crime 
problem within the state and it is a critical social issue requiring attention, however the 
adoption of repressive mano dura policies only served to exacerbate the gang situation 
and divert resources away from the other sources of violent homicide rates. 
On the other hand, the Guatemalan government did what it thought to be most 
prudent to avoid the high crime rates seen a couple years earlier in El Salvador. It kept its 
old security forces on the streets, while rapidly pushing new recruits through the 
academy. Admittance standards were lowered and the length of training shortened in 
efforts to rapidly get police forces through the system. Guatemala was able to avoid a 
sharp post-war crime flux, but the institutions as a whole has suffered over the long term. 
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There has been a gradual increase in violent crime rates since its civil war ended, and 
there is a legacy of corruption and distrust within the police force. The subsequent 
adoption of hardline policies in Guatemala, while not as severe as the mano dura policies 
in El Salvador, backfired, and it too saw an increase in violent crime.  
The findings of this comparative case study suggest that the strength of 
institutions does matter when it comes to maintaining order within a society, but also that 
government policy is an essential component that can serve to impact the effectiveness of 
those institutions.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The phenomenally high homicide rates in El Salvador and Guatemala continue to 
occupy headlines and generate discussion from policymakers, scholars, and analysts. The 
underlying structural issues that contribute to citizen insecurity did not form overnight, 
and it will take time to address the root causes. An important policy recommendation 
stemming from this research project is the importance of establishing an effective 
transitional public security force in the aftermath of a post conflict situation or regime 
change while building and training up the new force. The El Salvadoran case suggests the 
transitional force should be in place before the demobilization of the outgoing or 
occupying force. Furthermore, the Guatemalan case suggests that it is not sufficient 
enough to recycle existing forces and acknowledges the quality and thoroughness of 
training matters when building institutions.  
Another recommendation is the necessity of basing policy decisions and law 
enforcement plans on available data and research as opposed to perception. A common 
agreement among researchers is that more detailed data needs to be gathered in order to 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the crime phenomena in Central American states. 
Increased data collection and analysis would greatly assist policymakers and law 
enforcement agencies in providing targeted solutions. However, as policymakers in El 
Salvador and Guatemala continue to run on mano dura type platforms and use repressive 
strategies within law enforcement, it signifies they are ignoring the data that does exist. 
There is a plethora of literature and analysis on how mano dura does not work; yet it still 
 68
wins votes. In order to maximize the benefits aid to the region, more support should be 
given to policies, training, and plans that concentrate on the underlying structural issues 
within these states, and less to the more aggressive policies that have proven to be 
counterproductive.  
The Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) is the major United 
States effort to assist Central American states with improving public and citizen security. 
CARSI has five main goals. 
 Crate safe streets for citizens in the region 
 Disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and between the 
nations of Central America 
 Support the development of strong, capable and accountable Central 
American Governments 
 Re-establish effective state presence and security in communities at risk 
 Foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law coordination and 
cooperation between the nations of the region182 
Security assistance for Central America was first incorporated under the Merida 
Initiative with Mexico, but the plan split in 2010, having CARSI focus specifically on 
Central American states. The majority of CARSI funds and efforts have gone towards 
illegal drug interdiction.183 Drug use within these states has risen over the last several 
years, but most of the drugs transiting the region are en route to the United States. The 
security institutions in El Salvador and Guatemala do not have the capacity to confront 
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). DTOs have more financial resources and access to 
more advanced weapons than many local police forces. The illegal drug trafficking 
business is a significant contributor to state homicide rates. Given these factors the U.S. 
focus on supporting interdiction efforts seems to be well appointed. Another positive 
aspect of CARSI is that it ties aid to human rights conditions and law enforcement and 
                                                 
182 United States State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, “The Central America Regional Security 
Initiative: A Shared Partnership,” August 5, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145956.pdf. 
183 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Central America Regional Security 
Initiative: Background Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, CRS 
Report RL41731 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, February 21, 
2012), 25. 
 69
military personnel conducting operation with or receiving training from U.S. personnel 
have to be vetted.184 These types of restrictions demonstrate U.S. efforts to ensure 
funding is not wasted and will have a better chance at contributing to positive results 
within the states. Overall, CARSI has made positive contributions to increasing public 
security in El Salvador and Guatemala, and these efforts and engagements should 
continue.  
The sad reality is that high homicide rates will most likely continue to plague El 
Salvador and Guatemala over the next several years. Tackling problems such as drug 
trafficking, other organized crimes, and addressing youth gangs will take time. Of utmost 
importance, is making efforts to align public perception with reality. In doing so, 
resources can be allocated more effectively to address the continuously increasing high 
homicide rates. 
This research focused on the post-war development of security institutions, 
government policies, and how these factors have affected the state of crime in El 
Salvador and Guatemala.  However, institutions and domestic security policy are only 
one aspect. This case study touched on other variables worth examining and researching. 
For example, the role of the United Nations or other international entity in negotiating 
peace. In transitions, the presence and actions of these organizations during the critical 
juncture window impacted the paths these states took. Pressure from these organizations 
can serve to restrict or open options. Additionally, there was a major emphasis on 
building and reforming the security and political institutions in these countries. However, 
brutal wars such as those in Central America tear apart the state as well as the nation. In 
both countries, there was a lack of initiatives and plans for social and structural 
development to help the population transition. Finally, external transnational dynamics, 
specifically the regional crime wave and migration patterns, significantly overwhelmed 
state capacity. A detailed analysis of these overlapping domestic and international issues 
goes beyond the scope and length of this work, but is worth further examination and 
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research. Perhaps additional comparative studies with other Central American states 
would serve to identify additional policy recommendations. 
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